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Caveat Vendor:  
A Call to Reform the Scope of Rights of 
Withdrawal for Off-Premises Contracts 
Under U.S. Consumer Protection Laws 
with Respect to the Auction of Art 
Sarah Fabian Maramarosy* 
As sales of art at auction become increasingly popular and  
accessible, an overlooked consumer right may cause sellers of art 
to get “burned.” At its core, the auction process is intended to  
establish the price of a difficult-to-value object of art, therefore,  
the underlying philosophy of an auction is that sales are final.  
However, cooling-off rules in U.S. off-premises contracts are broad 
enough that auction house contracts can potentially fall within the 
ambit of these rules, giving rise to the consumer’s right to cancel 
the contract. 
Arguably, permitting consumers to cancel in remorse  
undermines the premise of an auction and may be detrimental to the 
market value of the artwork, the auctioneer’s business, and by  
extension the consumer. Cooling-off rules are ineffective in the  
context of art auctions because these rules were not drafted with an 
understanding of the mechanics of the auction process or the  
characteristics of the art market, including the subjective value of 
art. In fact, applying these rules to art transactions would be  
 
*  Symposium Editor, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law 
Journal, Volume XXX; J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2020; B.A., 
Political Science, University of Connecticut, 2012. I wish to acknowledge the invaluable 
contributions, insightful comments, and steadfast encouragement of Professors Aditi 
Bagchi and Leila Amineddoleh. I would like to thank the IPLJ Editorial Board and Staff, 
particularly Senior Writing & Research Editor Elliot Fink, for their feedback. I would like 
to also extend a special thank you to my friends and family for their love and support during 
the writing process. 
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consumer protection overreach. These rules were designed to  
redress high pressure sales techniques used by door-to-door  
salesmen who cornered vulnerable consumers at home. By contrast, 
the relationship between an auction house and a consignor or  
winning bidder is very different: the balance of bargaining power 
favors the consumer. Further, for the auction process to be effective, 
the consumer cannot be permitted to walk away from the sale  
out of remorse. 
Despite some ambiguity in the U.S. legal framework, it is  
important to not assume that these cooling-off rules do not apply to 
auction house contracts. Such a mistake could extend the prescribed 
cooling-off period indefinitely, thus aggravating the costs of  
administering returns. Ultimately, the art world will be handicapped 
by the uncertainty of the application of these rules, therefore, the 
time for reform is now. It is upon stakeholders in the artworld, who 
have industry expertise that regulators and legislators are unlikely 
to have, to proactively petition the Federal Trade Commission to 
develop new approaches to the right to withdraw as it relates to  
art transactions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
If you were to buy a work of art at an auction in New York, you 
probably would not be able to return it; but in London, you could 
return it during a “cooling-off” period. A cooling-off period, or 
withdrawal right, is a state-mandated contract term that provides 
consumers the power to cancel a contract without cause during a set 
timeframe.1 While this consumer right provides buyers leeway to 
reconsider the bargain, sellers of art may get “burned.”2 
Under European law, consumers have a generic right to  
withdraw from contracts formed outside of the seller’s business 
premises. 3  Recent changes to the European Commission’s  
Consumer Rights Directive (“CRD”) explicitly include auctions 
within the scope of this regulation.4 These changes have prompted 
auction houses in Europe to amend their contracts to include notice 
of the right to withdraw,5 and have led to apprehension about the 
 
1 Patricia Sánchez Abril, et al., The Right of Withdrawal in Consumer Contracts: A 
Comparative Analysis of American and European Law, INDRET, March 2018, at 31; see 
also Pamaria Rekaiti & Roger Van den Bergh, Cooling-Off Periods in the Consumer Laws 
of the EC Member States: A Comparative Law and Economics Approach, 23 J. CONSUMER 
POL’Y 371, 371, 373 (2000) (stating that a cooling-off period is also “referred to as a right 
to cancellation, as a right to rescind, disaffirm, or revoke a contract, or more generally as a 
withdrawal right.”). 
2 A work of art is “burned” when it fails to sell at auction. See Is an Artwork “BURNT” 
by Failing to Sell at a Public Auction?, ARTEMUNDI GLOBAL FUND (Jan. 13, 2014), 
http://artemundiglobalfund.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Myth-Busters-BI-
Analysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/DX4U-E2FF] [hereinafter BI Report]. 
3 See Council Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
25 October 2011 on Consumer Rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and 
Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Repealing 
Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council, 2011 O.J. (L 304) 64 (EC). 
4 See generally Kinfemicheal Yilma Desta, The Scope of Rights of Withdrawal in 
Consumer Contracts Under EU Law: The Case of Auctions, UIO (2012), 
https://www.duo.uio.no/handle/10852/34428 [https://perma.cc/FHN6-HF8]. 
5 Compare Conditions of Online-Only Sale, PHILLIPS (Oct. 19, 2018), 
https://www.phillips.com/buysell/online-only/conditions [https://perma.cc/4KV7-835P] 
(including a notice provision for the European right of withdrawal at paragraph 11), with 
Conditions of Sale, PHILLIPS (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.phillips.com/buysell/
newyork/conditions [https://perma.cc/MC6B-DRW6] (lacking notice of the U.S. right of 
withdrawal). These disclosure amendments are significant because in instances where the 
right to withdraw applies and the seller fails to inform the consumer of this right, the 
cancellation (“cooling-off”) period may be automatically extended until actual notice is 
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fate of the European art market.6 Pierre Valentin, Sotheby’s former 
in-house counsel, has warned that this new consumer protection law 
may undermine the auctioning of art because “[t]he right to cancel 
is fundamentally incompatible with the sale at auction of art,  
antiques and collectible items.”7 
Withdrawal rights are incompatible with art auctions because  
returning a work of art poses potentially devastating consequences 
to a one-of-a-kind item’s value.8 The price of art is volatile and  
reputationally sensitive to such a degree that the art community  
considers art that fails to sell “burnt,” which significantly decreases 
its value.9 Burning could make it difficult to sell the piece of art for 
many years to come.10 It could even negatively impact the price of 
the artist’s other works as well as those within the same art  
movement.11 Thus, if either a consignor or winning bidder were to 
withdraw after a widely publicized auction, the auction house (and 
by extension the consumer) would be stuck with the tremendous cost 
 
provided. See infra Appendix A. Therefore, the cooling-off period could extend 
indefinitely, and permit buyers to return years later to rescind the sale. See infra Part I.B.2. 
6 See Anny Shaw, New Rules Threaten Online Art Market in the UK, ART NEWSPAPER, 
(Jan. 9, 2014), https://www.artatlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/New-rules-
threaten-online-art-market-in-the-UK-The-Art-Newspaper-Jan-2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3YSH-AULE]; Georgina Adam, Los Angeles Art Market Hots Up, FIN. 
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2014), https://www.artatlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Los-
Angeles-art-market-hots-up-FT-Sept-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/5C3X-Q54D]; New 
Consumer Remedies: Be Prepared, ANTIQUES TRADE GAZETTE (Oct. 10, 2015), 
https://www.artatlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/New-consumer-remedies-be-
prepared-Antiques-Trade-Gazette-October-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/99JS-YAFT]; 
Ashitha Nagesh, UK Law Change to Jeopardize Online Art Market, BLOUIN ARTINFO (Apr. 
12, 2016), https://constantinecannon.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/UK-Law-Change-
to-Jeopardise-Online-Art-Market-BLOUIN-ARTINFO-Jan-2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UL5H-3LFD]. 
7 Pierre Valentin, Danger Ahead – Auctions Undermined by New Consumer Protection, 
ART AT L. (Nov. 23, 2013), https://www.artatlaw.com/archives/archives-2013-july-
dec/danger-ahead-auctions-undermined-by-new-consumer-protection 
[https://perma.cc/8SWU-7SUV]. 
8 Id. 
9 See generally BI Report, supra note 2. 
10 See id. 
11 See CHARLES W. SMITH, AUCTIONS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VALUE 3 (1989); 
see also DOUG WOODHAM, ART COLLECTING TODAY: MARKET INSIGHTS FOR EVERYONE 
PASSIONATE ABOUT ART 74–75 (2017). 
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of both preparing the sale and a work of art that is no longer  
commercially viable.12 
For almost fifty years, federal and state regulatory regimes in the 
United States have provided consumers rights of withdrawal similar 
to those now available in the European Union (“E.U.”).13 Americans 
do not seem to be generally aware of this device in the consumer 
protection toolbox,14 or at least do not seem to frequently exercise 
their right to withdraw.15 Indeed, the history of this right as intended 
to remedy coercive, door-to-door sales practices has cast a shadow 
over the American right of withdrawal and caused them to be over-
looked as being narrow in scope.16 In fact, major U.S. auction house 
contracts do not contain notice of the right to withdraw like their 
European counterparts. 17  This omission may mean that auction 
houses have not contemplated the application of the U.S. rights of 
withdrawal. Alternatively, they may believe that the rights do not 
apply to the auction of art in light of these rights’ intended purpose. 
It is important not to assume that rights of withdrawal do not 
apply to auction house contracts. An agreement between the  
consumer and the auction house can meet the definition of an off-
premises contract18 depending on the circumstances of the sale.19 If 
that happens and the consumer has not been given notice of their 
right to withdraw, the cooling-off period may extend indefinitely 
and the costs of administering a return will increase.20 
This Note first surveys U.S. cooling-off rules in order to clarify 
whether the right to withdraw in fact applies to art auctions such that 
 
12 See Valentin, supra note 7. 
13 See Jeff Sovern, Written Notice of Cooling-off Periods: A Forty-Year Natural 
Experiment in Illusory Consumer Protection and the Relative Effectiveness of Oral and 
Written Disclosures, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 333, 333 (2014). 
14 Sánchez Abril, supra note 1, at 18. 
15 Sovern, supra note 13, at 333. 
16 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Eric A. Posner, The Right to Withdraw in Contract Law, 40 
J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 115 (2011). 
17 Compare Conditions of Online-Only Sale, supra note 5, with Conditions of Sale, supra 
note 5. 
18 The term “off-premises contracts” as used in this Note, refers to contracts signed at 
any location other than the seller’s business premises, e.g., the buyer’s or seller’s home. 
19 See infra Part II.B.2. 
20 See infra Appendix A. 
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consignors may withdraw from an auction or that winning bidders 
may rescind a purchase. After examining the broad language and 
common law application of these rules as well as the similarity of 
auction house transactions to door-to-door sales, this Note  
determines that under a literal reading, art auctions are plausibly 
subject to withdrawal rights.21 
However, withdrawal rights cannot be justified at art auctions 
under the consumer advocate perspective because their application 
would materially harm the value of the artwork on the auction block, 
pose a significant challenge to the auction business, and fail to meet 
the redistributive objectives of consumer protection policy.22 Thus, 
while buyers have not yet prevailed in invoking the right to  
withdraw against an art auction house,23 and the extent of this prob-
lem is not entirely clear, the potential certainly is. 
In order to prevent these inequitable and undesired outcomes, 
this Note will seek to establish that U.S. withdrawal rights should 
not apply to art auctions and recommends an explicit carve-out  
under the federal regulation with the hope that the states will follow 
suit.24 This result would fit with the general principles of behavioral 
economic scholarship and the intended purpose of the cooling-off 
rules. Alternatively, if such an amendment to the federal cooling-off 
rule is rejected, this Note recommends that auction houses mitigate 
associated risks by amending their contracts to include notice of the 
right to withdraw and take steps to minimize the risk of cancellation 
rights arising inadvertently.25 
 
21 See infra Part II. 
22 See infra Parts I; Part III. 
23 See generally Morris v. Steffes Grp., Inc., 924 N.W.2d 491, 496–97 (Iowa 2019), 
reh’g denied, (Mar. 28, 2019); Vaks v. Ryan, 2012 Mass. App. Div. 17 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 
2012), award vacated, 2014 Mass. App. Div. 37 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2014); Holm v. Berner, 
No. 06-CA-140, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 3148 (Ohio Ct. App. June 29, 2007). Notably, 
rights of withdrawal have been applied to transactions with art galleries, where courts have 
allowed art collectors to cancel deals. See generally Pritzker v. Krishna Gallery of Asian 
Arts, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14398 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1996); Vom Lehn v. Astor Art 
Galleries, Ltd., 380 N.Y.S.2d 532 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976). 
24 See infra Part IV. 
25 An example of such steps includes signing agreements only at the auction house 
business premises. 
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Part I of this Note recounts the origin and basis of withdrawal 
rights for off-premises contracts in the United States. It then  
examines the laws that define rights of withdrawal in all fifty states, 
including a federal regulation, in terms of their substantive  
prohibitions, their scope, and the remedies that they provide  
consumers. Part II discusses how art is distinguishable from  
common consumer goods; additionally, this Part outlines the  
respective contracts between auction houses, consignors, and  
winning bidders. Eventually, Part II evaluates whether U.S.  
withdrawal rights plausibly cover the sale of art at auction. Part III 
analyzes the consequences of applying the right to withdraw to art 
auctions, and the various incentives of consignors and bidders to 
take advantage of this right to avoid a contract. Ultimately, Part IV 
proposes three possible amendments to the federal withdrawal right 
that would minimize the substantial costs this right may create at art 
auctions: (1) an exception for art auctions or the sale of art; (2)  
imposition of a cancellation fee; and, alternatively, (3) an exclusion 
for transactions over a maximum purchase price. 
I. OVERVIEW OF RIGHTS OF WITHDRAWAL 
A. Rationale Behind Rights of Withdrawal 
1. Regulatory and State Legislative Purposes 
The regulatory and legislative rationale underpinning with-
drawal rights is to protect consumers from sales techniques that 
usurp their rational  
decision-making process and exploit their lack of expertise.26  A 
 
26 See, e.g., N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 425 (“The purpose of this act is to afford consumers 
a “cooling-off” period to cancel contracts which are entered into as a result of high pressure 
door-to-door sales tactics.”); see also Fred S. McChesney, Behavioral Economics: Old 
Wine in Irrelevant New Bottles?, 21 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 68 (2013) (discussing that 
cooling-off rules are founded on principles of bounded rationality, “justified by claims of 
ignorance and other failures of consumer choice”); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, 
Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1162, 1188 (2003) 
(discussing that cooling-off rules make the most sense in circumstances where consumers 
are particularly likely to make decisions they will regret, i.e., “when two conditions are 
met: (1) people are making decisions that they make infrequently and for which they 
therefore lack a great deal of experience, and (2) emotions are likely to be running high”). 
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cooling-off period can protect consumers from their own “heat-of-
the-moment” impulses by allowing them to reevaluate contracts 
without the salesman present and without resorting to breach of  
contract remedies. 27  Thus, withdrawal rights can improve the  
bargaining position of consumers, and as such are powerful tools for 
consumer protection.28 
In the context of door-to-door sales, withdrawal rights were  
created to balance fairness in a shopping environment that renders 
consumers more vulnerable to entering into contracts that go against 
their best interests. 29  Consumers in the comfort of their homes  
already occupy a less deliberative state of mind and therefore  
become more susceptible to overestimating the value of a purchase 
or underestimating the risks of poor contract terms.30 What’s more, 
when a door-to-door salesman intrudes into the privacy of one’s 
home, the surprise element catches the consumer off-guard.31 The 
consumer may also feel obliged to listen to an overzealous  
salesman’s pitch and agree to the proposed contract in order to get 
the seller to leave their home.32 
 
27 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance 
Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 239 (2012) (noting that “contract law 
provides remedies, but enforcement is costly and largely impractical.”); see also Colin 
Camerer, et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for 
“Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1239 (2003); Sunstein & Thaler, 
supra note 26, at 1191. 
28 See Rekaiti & Van den Bergh, supra note 1, at 371; Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-
Shahar, Exit From Contract, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 151, 151 (2014) (“Exit from contract is 
one of the most powerful consumer protection devices, freeing consumers from bad deals 
and keeping businesses honest.”). 
29 See Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. 
REV 749, 749 (2008); see also Camerer et al., supra note 27, at 1215, 1238. 
30 Michael R. Mattioli, Cooling-Off & Secondary Markets: Consumer Choice in the 
Digital Domain, 15 VA. J.L. & TECH. 227, 236–37 (2010); see also Ben-Shahar & Posner, 
supra note 16, at 120; Harry M. Brittenham, et al., The Direct Selling Industry: An 
Empirical Study, 16 UCLA L. REV. 890, 895–922 (1969). 
31 FTC Cooling-Off Period for Door-To-Door Sales, 37 Fed. Reg. 22933, 22937–39 
(Oct. 26, 1972) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 429) [hereinafter FTC Cooling-Off Rule 
Statement of Basis and Purpose] (“The door to door selling technique strips from the 
consumer one of the fundamentals in his role as an informed purchaser, the decision as to 
when, where, and how he will present himself to the marketplace.”). 
32 One consumer explained why they listened to the sales pitch and ultimately signed 
the contract this way: “I was frightened of the man. I didn’t know how to get rid of him.” 
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Additionally, studies show that door-to-door salesmen were 
trained to utilize coercive sales tactics to “make the kill.” 33  
Problematic sales practices included badgering, harassment, and  
intimidation. For example, consumers complained that they were 
pressured into deals by aggressive salesmen who spent hours “with 
them late at night making numerous oral promises, wearing down 
their resistance and even intimidating them.”34  Another concern  
included sales pitches that convinced the consumer that they must 
purchase “now or never” because the seller offers unusual goods or 
a special deal that cannot be obtained elsewhere.35 The consumer, 
who may already feel overwhelmed by the circumstances of an  
unexpected house call, may find it difficult to fully evaluate all 
available alternatives with reasoned judgment and appropriate  
self-interest in the face of the salesman’s presence in the home  
and insistence upon an immediate response. 36  This situation  
is fraught with the possibility of undue influence, intimidation,  
and over-reaching.37 
A cooling-off period alleviates the immediacy of the salesman’s 
influence and lessens the element of surprise by providing the  
consumer additional time after signing the contract to reconsider the 
commitment. 38  During this extra time, consumers can rationally 
weigh the purchase decision against their needs and resources,  
consult with others, and even engage in comparative shopping  
before the contract becomes irrevocable.39 In this way, cooling-off 
 
FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31, at 22938 n.39; see 
also Camerer et al., supra note 27, at 1215, 1238. 
33 See, e.g., FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31, at 
22938 n.42; see also Brittenham, et al., supra note 30, at 890. 
34 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31, at 22937 n.32. 
35 See Rekaiti & Van den Bergh, supra note 1, at 378. 
36 See generally FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31. 
37 See generally id. 
38 See Byron D. Sher, The Cooling-Off Period in Door-to-Door Sales, 15 UCLA L. REV. 
717, 717 (1968) (“The interval immediately following the point at which a salesman 
secures the buyer’s signature has been called the ‘decompression’ period, a graphic 
description of the decline in the intensity of a consumer’s desire to possess the goods or 
services often experienced after the salesman has departed. And the interval within which 
the consumer is permitted by statute to cancel his contract or offer is commonly referred to 
as the ‘cooling-off’ period.”). 
39 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31, at 22942. 
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period rules are able to “redistribute” the transaction costs between 
the contracting parties and balance the bargaining power between 
consumers and sellers.40 
2. Contract Theory 
From a contract law perspective, the temporary impaired  
judgment caused by a doorstep sale also justifies paternalistic laws 
such as withdrawal rights.41  These rights formally recognize that 
the consumer’s perceived freedom to enter the contract may have 
been compromised.42 A cooling-off period can encourage sound 
judgement and diminish the influence of unfair persuasion on  
contract formation.43 
However, restricting an individual’s freedom to commit to a  
legally enforceable promise is no small matter. 44  Most scholars 
 
40 See Rekaiti & Van den Bergh, supra note 1, at 373. To be clear, the cooling-off rule 
is intended to redistribute to the consumer what is taken away from the seller. Id. at 374. If 
the consumer were asked to pay for the withdrawal right through depreciation costs, 
cancellation fees, or even higher prices, the consumer would be in the same, or worse, 
position than prior to the implementation of the rule. See id. Any such result would 
undermine the redistributive goals of consumer protection law. Id. 
41 See Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 
786–87 (1983). Any legal rule that proscribes action to prevent people from acting against 
their own interests is paternalistic. Id. at 763, 797. 
42 Sánchez Abril, supra note 1, at 33 (“[F]rom a dogmatic point of view, the right of 
withdrawal is linked to a defective formation of the consumer’s will, which is offset with 
the power . . . to terminate the contract.”). 
43 Kronman, supra note 41, at 788. Yet, Professor Kronman cautions that “[t]his 
argument  . . .  is overbroad: The ways in which a person’s judgment may be impaired are 
protean, but we quite properly refuse to recognize lack of judgment as a general defense 
against the claim that one has failed to meet his contractual obligations. What explains the 
law’s selectivity in this regard and the particular pattern of restrictions it enforces?” Id. at 
794. 
44 Id. at 795 (“[T]he requirement of a cooling-off period has antidemocratic 
implications, which explains why we demand a special justification for these restrictions 
and would never think of imposing a cooling-off period in every contractual relationship.”); 
Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1277, 
1364 (1984) (“[A withdrawal right] enhances people’s freedom by giving them a chance 
to decide what they actually want without excessive pressure, and it limits their freedom 
by prohibiting them from contracting as early as they might want to. Both the existence 
and the nonexistence of such a rule can be praised—and also condemned—for its 
contribution to the formation of voluntary contracts.”). 
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agree that such legal intervention should not apply in every  
contractual relationship.45 As one scholar explains: 
The right of withdrawal implies above all the  
acknowledgment of a very relevant exception to the 
fundamental dogma of contract law: the duty to  
fulfill what is promised (pacta sunt servanda). For 
that reason, no legal system can grant the contracting 
parties the power to withdraw in a generalized and 
indiscriminate fashion, but rather on an extraordi-
nary basis and only in cases that are  
sufficiently justified. Otherwise, the complete  
private contract system would be contingent upon the 
whim of the buyer of goods and services, which, in 
turn, would imperil the very functioning of  
the market.46 
In fact, Oren Bar-Gill argues that withdrawal rights should be 
based on strong market-specific evidence of consumer mistakes that 
create substantial welfare costs. 47  He recommends empirical  
research to determine if the mistakes are systemic to an industry: 
“regulation should only be considered where such specific evidence 
proves the existence, in the specific market, of a behavioral market 
failure that generates significant welfare costs.”48 Cass Sunstein and 
Richard Thaler also emphasize the need for welfare analysis that 
balances the costs and benefits of such programs.49 
 
45 See, e.g., OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT 42–43 (2012) (“There are many 
consumer markets and many more consumer contracts. Each market is embedded in a 
unique historical, institutional, political, and legal context. Most importantly, the 
underlying currents of consumer psychology and market forces, while following common 
patterns, manifest in unique ways in different markets. When it comes to considering 
regulatory intervention, a detailed market analysis is imperative.”); Yilma Desta, supra 
note 4, at 4 (“A far reaching instrument like withdrawal right has to be crafted with care 
and having taken due account of all potential effects of extending the right to a wide range 
of consumer contracts.”); see also Camerer et al., supra note 27, at 1239; Sunstein & 
Thaler, supra note 26, at 1166. 
46 Sánchez Abril, supra note 1, at 43 (emphasis added). 
47 See Bar-Gill, supra note 29, at 790. 
48 Id. at 801–02. 
49 Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 26, at 1166 (“[Paternalistic] programs should be 
designed using a type of welfare analysis, one in which a serious attempt is made to 
measure the costs and benefits of outcomes.”). 
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Yet, there is doubt about whether enough evidence even  
supports utilizing withdrawal rights.50 For example, a review of the 
federal right of withdrawal’s “Statement of Basis and Purpose” 
shows a lack of quantitative analysis. 51  The Federal Trade  
Commission (“Commission” or “FTC”) actually dismissed  
testimony of state officials who concluded similar state rules did not 
benefit consumers on the basis of statistical evidence.52 In fact, the 
FTC primarily relied on anecdotal evidence and a survey that  
contained a disclaimer of its validity. 53  While such anecdotal  
evidence is more illustrative and poignant, it is often unreliable.54 
Further, at least from examining the administrative history of the 
federal rule, there is no evidence to indicate that empirical research 
on the art market was used to support enactment of the right of  
withdrawal.55 Those favoring the extension of the withdrawal right 
to the art market must be sensitive to the potential economic  
ramifications because this right defies a one-size-fits-all  
framework.56 Failing to take account of the unique dynamics of the 
art market and indiscriminately using withdrawal rights could harm 
the industry as well as consumers.57 
B. Rights of Withdrawal in U.S. Off-Premises Contracts 
The “radical” concept of providing consumers with the right to 
withdraw from door-to-door sales contracts originated with the  
 
50 JOSEPH P. MULHOLLAND, SUMMARY REPORT ON THE FTC BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 
CONFERENCE 22 (Apr. 20, 2007) (“Notwithstanding the apparent widespread acceptance of 
cooling-off rules, they do not appear to have been subjected to the kind of asymmetric 
paternalism or unfairness analysis discussed at the conference. For example, the FTC rule 
appears to have been created without the benefit of any systematic research to document 
its value.”) (emphasis added). But see FTC Rule Concerning Cooling-Off Period for Sales 
Made at Homes or at Certain Other Locations, 60 Fed. Reg. 54180 (Oct. 20, 1995) 
[hereinafter 1995 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Non-Substantive Amendments] (noting the FTC 
conducted a regulatory review of the FTC Cooling-Off Rule in the mid-1990s and 
concluded that the rule provides benefits to consumers). 
51 See McChesney, supra note 26, at 69. 
52 See id. 
53 See id. 
54 See STEFAN H. KRIEGER & RICHARD K. NUEMAN, Jr. ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS 
41 (2015). 
55 See generally FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31. 
56 See Sánchez Abril, supra note 1, at 43. 
57 See id. 
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English Committee on Consumer Protection in 1962, which  
recommended providing buyers a three-day period to cancel  
installment contracts.58  The idea was transplanted to the United 
States within the year when New York and Pennsylvania enacted 
the earliest right-to-withdraw statutes.59 In 1970, the FTC published 
a notice of proposed rulemaking that provided for a withdrawal right 
in door-to-door sales and other off-premises contracts.60 As concern 
for consumer welfare gained momentum, other states introduced 
right-of-withdrawal statutes such that today all fifty states have their 
own law in effect.61 
1. Federal Regulation 
In 1972, the FTC promulgated the “Cooling-off Period For Sales 
Made At Homes Or At Certain Other Locations” (“Cooling-Off 
Rule” or “Rule”) to provide consumers the unilateral right to cancel 
transactions without justification or cost.62 The Rule grants buyers  
a cooling-off period of three business days to exercise their right  
to withdraw.63 
A fairly broad range of contracts are subject to cancellation  
under the Rule. The Rule defines door-to-door sales as transactions 
where the seller of consumer goods or services64 personally solicits 
 
58 See Sher, supra note 38, at 717–18. 
59 Wade R. Thompson, A New Remedy for California Consumers: The Right to Cancel 
a Home Solicitation Contract, 3 PAC. L.J. 633, 633 n.7 (1972) (noting enactment of 73 PA. 
STAT. ANN. § 500-202(c)(4) and N.Y. PERS. PROP. §§ 425–430 in 1962). But see Byron D. 
Sher, supra note 38, at 719 (noting enactment of 73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 500-202(c)(4) in 
1966 and MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.417(202)(c)(4) in 1965 as the earliest right of withdrawal 
statutes in the United States). 
60 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31, at 22933. 
61 See infra Appendix A. 
62 FTC Rule Concerning Cooling-Off Period for Sales Made at Homes or at Certain 
Other Locations, 16 C.F.R. § 429 (2018). To clarify that the rule is intended to cover more 
than the paradigm door-to-door sale, the Rule was amended in 1995 to change the name 
from “Cooling-Off Period for Door-to-Door Sales” to “Rule Concerning Cooling-Off 
Period for Sales Made at Homes or at Certain Other Locations.” See 1995 FTC Cooling-
Off Rule Non-Substantive Amendments, supra note 50, at 54180. 
63 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (“You, the buyer, may cancel this transaction at any time prior to 
midnight of the third business day after the date of this transaction.”); 16 C.F.R. § 429.0(f) 
(defining business day as any day except Sunday or a federal holiday). 
64 16 C.F.R. § 429.0(b) (defining consumer goods or services as those primarily used for 
personal, family or household purposes). 
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the sale and the buyer makes the offer or agreement to purchase at 
some location other than the seller’s place of business, even where 
the buyer initiated contact.65 If the sale was finalized at the buyer’s 
home, the consumer may cancel a contract valued at $25 or above; 
if consummated at another location, the minimum threshold  
is $130.66 
The Rule was primarily addressed to direct sellers, 67  i.e.,  
salesmen who capitalize on person-to-person contact to sell at loca-
tions where consumers have not yet made the conscious decision to 
enter a store to make a purchase.68 For instance, drafters of the Rule 
contemplated door-to-door sales of, inter alia, home appliances,  
encyclopedia subscriptions, and home improvement services.69 
The limited purpose of the Rule was to remedy the problem of 
sales obtained through deceptive and high-pressure sales tactics 
used on consumers who are vulnerable to having their judgement 
swayed by an unexpected sales pitch. 70  In particular, the FTC  
justified the Rule on five problems characteristic of personal  
solicitation sales: 
 Deception by the seller in getting inside the door; 
 High-pressure sales tactics; 
 Misrepresentation of the quality, price or 
characteristics of the product; 
 High price for low-quality product; and 
 
65 16 C.F.R. § 429.0(a) (defining a door-to-door sale as “[a] sale, lease, or rental of 
consumer goods or services in which the seller or his representative personally solicits the 
sale, including those in response to or following an invitation by the buyer, and the buyer’s 
agreement or offer to purchase is made at a place other than the place of business of the 
seller (e.g., sales at the buyer’s residence or at facilities rented on a temporary or short-
term basis, such as hotel or motel rooms, convention centers, fairgrounds and restaurants, 
or sales at the buyer’s workplace or in dormitory lounges) . . . .”). 
66 16 C.F.R. § 429.0(a). 
67 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31, at 22936, 
22913. 
68 Business Guidance Concerning Multi-Level Marketing, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
(Jan. 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/business-guidance-
concerning-multi-level-marketing. [https://perma.cc/C9P6-VLDE]. For background 
information on the direct selling industry see generally Brittenham, et al., supra note 30. 
69 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31, at 22936. 
70 1995 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Non-Substantive Amendments, supra note 50, at 54184. 
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 Nuisance created by the unexpected salesman’s 
house call.71 
To limit application of the Rule to transactions where such 
abuses were found, certain sales have been excluded. The definition 
of “door-to-door sales” excludes: (1) transactions made pursuant to 
prior negotiations at the seller’s trade premises, 72  and (2)  
transactions conducted and executed entirely by mail or telephone.73 
These exclusions recognize that the pressure to buy is less intense 
when the buyer can easily escape an aggressive sales pitch by  
leaving the business establishment or hanging up the phone.74 
Other exemptions have been added for sellers of arts and crafts 
at fairs75 and sellers of motor vehicles sold at auction.76 Clearly,  
consumers purposely attending an auction or fair cannot be subject 
to an unexpected sales pitch.77 Additionally, the consumer at an  
auction or fair has the opportunity to shop around between different 
vendors; therefore, misrepresentations that characterize doorstep 
sales are less likely.78 Notably, in adopting these amendments, the 
Commission stressed that the Rule continues to apply to sales made 
“at a place other than the place of business of the seller . . . .  [h]ence, 
the Rule applies to public auctions, tent sales, and sales at fairs.”79 
Arguably, this explicit inclusion of public auctions encompasses art 
auctions.80 
 
71 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31, at 22937. 
72 16 C.F.R. § 429.0(a)(1). 
73 16 C.F.R. § 429.0(a)(4). 
74 See 1995 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Non-Substantive Amendments, supra note 50, at 
54184. 
75 16 C.F.R. § 429.3(b). 
76 16 C.F.R. § 429.3(a). These exemptions were prompted by a letter petition from 
Public Auto Auction. See FTC Rule on Cooling-Off Period for Door-to-Door Sales, 52 
Fed. Reg. 29539, 29540–41 (Aug. 10, 1987) [hereinafter 1987 FTC Cooling-Off Rule 
Proposed Exemptions]. In adopting the amendments, the Commission explained that an 
auctioneer is not necessarily a “seller” under the Rule, and that the Rule would not apply 
to the auctioneer unless they are involved in directly selling goods or services to buyers. 
See FTC Rule on Cooling-Off Period for Door-to-Door Sales, 53 Fed. Reg. 45455, 45458 
n.23 (Nov. 10, 1988) [hereinafter 1988 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Final Exemptions]. 
77 See 1987 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Proposed Exemptions, supra note 76, at 29541. 
78 Id. 
79 1988 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Final Exemptions, supra note 76, at 45457 n.10 
(emphasis added). 
80 See infra Part II.C. 
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Additionally, the Rule makes it an unfair or deceptive practice 
for the seller to fail to give the buyer both a verbal notice and a clear 
and conspicuous written notice about the buyer’s right to cancel at 
the time of purchase.81 The Rule requires that the contract include 
duplicate copies of the notice of the buyer’s right to withdraw and a 
specifically worded cancellation form, all of which must be in  
boldface type with a particular minimum size font and substantially 
comply with the language set forth in the regulation. 82  These  
draconian notice requirements recognize that the right to withdraw 
would be useless if consumers were not fully informed of their rights 
before the cooling-off period expires.83 
The Commission considered whether failure to meet these notice 
requirements should extend the cooling-off period.84 However, the 
Rule was not intended to be a “buyer’s remorse program.”85 As 
such, these remedial proposals were repeatedly rejected as too puni-
tive to adopt.86 
Within ten days after cancellation, the Rule requires the seller to 
give the buyer a full refund of any payment or return any goods  
bartered in exchange.87 Because these provisions were designed to 
minimize the burden on the consumer, the seller bears the risk if they 
perform services prior to the expiration of the cooling-off period.88 
Thus, consumers are assured free withdrawal.89 
 
81 See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 429.1. 
82 See id. 
83 See id. 
84 See 1995 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Non-Substantive Amendments, supra note 50, at 
54185 (discussing that tolling the cooling-off period with notice would penalize the seller 
and is too remedial an amendment to adopt); FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and 
Purpose, supra note 31, at 22957 (same). 
85 1995 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Non-Substantive Amendments, supra note 50, at 54184 
(“The Cooling-Off Rule was not intended to be a federal ‘satisfaction guarantee’ 
requirement or ‘buyers’ remorse’ insurance program . . . . The Rule instead has the limited 
purpose of correcting the specific problem of sales being obtained through high pressure 
and deceptive sales tactics used on consumers at times and places in which consumers 
typically may not expect to be solicited for sales and find it difficult to extricate themselves 
from the situation.”) (emphasis added). 
86 See 16 C.F.R. § 429.2. 
87 See 16 C.F.R. § 429.1(g). 
88 See FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31, at 22947. 
89 See id. 
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Importantly, the Federal Trade Commission Act does not create 
a private cause of action.90 Therefore, only the FTC has the power 
to initiate an enforcement action for violations of the Cooling-Off 
Rule. 91  However, the Rule is not intended to preempt state  
law where greater protection is given to consumers; thus, consumers 
may take advantage of state statutes that provide private rights  
of action.92 
Finally, because the right of withdrawal is a consumer protection 
right, parties cannot expressly waive or contract away this right.93 
The federal regulation and some states explicitly void any waiver of 
the right to withdraw.94 
 
90 The court in Rojas v. Ygrene Energy Fund, Inc. specifically addressed the cancellation 
rights under the Rule, as well as the FTCA in general, finding that a claim brought by an 
individual seeking to cancel a contract will be dismissed for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Rojas v. Ygrene Energy Fund, Inc., No. 18-cv-579, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
60945, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2018). 
91 See id. at *2. 
92 See FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31, at 22958 
(“If the State cooling-off laws give the consumer greater benefit and protection in regard 
to notice, time for election of the cancellation remedy, or in transactions exempted from 
this rule, there seems to be no reason to deprive the affected consumer of these additional 
benefits.”). Where a claim does proceed to trial, the Rule does not provide for remedies in 
addition to those otherwise applicable to unfair and deceptive acts or practices under the 
FTCA. Crystal v. W. & Callahan, Inc., 328 Md. 318, 328 (Ct. App. Md. 1992). In United 
States v. Union Circulation Co., the court held that penalties that take into account the 
injury to the public, prior history of violations, defendant’s knowledge of the Rule and their 
financial resources could be imposed for violation of the Cooling-Off Rule. United States. 
v. Union Circulation Co., No. C81-997A, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18794, at *11–12 (N.D. 
Ga. Mar. 4, 1983) (ordering defendant sellers of magazine subscriptions to pay a civil 
penalty of $15,000 and attorney’s fees for violation of the Cooling-Off Rule). 
93 See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 429.1(d) (“[I]t constitutes an unfair and deceptive act or practice 
for any seller to  . . .  [i]nclude in any door-to-door contract or receipt any  . . .  any waiver 
of any of the rights to which the buyer is entitled under this section including specifically 
the buyer’s right to cancel the sale.”). 
94 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-5002(D) (2018) (“Any provision of a contract, 
offer or agreement that waives a buyer’s right of cancellation under this section is void and 
has no effect.”); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1689.12 (Deering 2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 
4404(4) (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-13 (2018); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481C-2(4) 
(LexisNexis 2018); IOWA CODE ANN. § 555A.4(2) (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-640(b)(4) 
(2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.460 (LexisNexis 2018); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 
14-302(1)(ii)(4) (LexisNexis 2018); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93, § 48(G) (LexisNexis 2018); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-21(A)(4) (LexisNexis 2018); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-18-08.1 
(2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-24-5.5 (2018). 
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2. State Statutes 
Every state has a consumer protection law that recognizes a 
buyer’s right to withdraw from contracts consummated outside of 
the seller’s business premises. 95  While most state rights are  
substantially similar to the federal rule,96 the state laws differ in at 
least two key ways. 
First, the state right-to-withdraw statutes tend to be more  
protective of consumers. For example, most states go beyond the 
federal rule by providing consumers a private right of action, and 
some even impose a monetary penalty against sellers for violation 
of the statute.97 Critically, state statutes are not preempted unless 
they provide less protection to consumers.98 Thus, provisions that 
provide a private enforcement mechanism will not be preempted; 
however, cancellation fee clauses or exemptions with no counterpart 
in the federal rule will be preempted.99 For instance, certain states 
 
95 See infra Appendix A. 
96 Like the federal rule, most states allow consumers a cooling-off period of three days 
after signing a contract to reconsider purchases of goods or services above twenty-five 
dollars. Alaska is the only state in the nation that permits the buyer to exercise their right 
to cancel for as long as five days, and lowers the threshold of contracts subject to 
cancellation to a minimum of $10. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.02.350(a) (2018). A few states 
like New York, incorporate exceptions established in the federal Rule for transactions made 
pursuant to prior negotiations at the seller’s trade premises and those conducted entirely 
over the telephone or mail. See, e.g., N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 426(1)(a) (Consol. 2018) 
(defining the term door-to-door sale does not include a transaction made pursuant to prior 
negotiations at seller’s trade premises); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 426(1)(c) (defining the 
term door-to-door sale does not include a transaction conducted and consummated entirely 
by mail or telephone, and without any other contact between the buyer and the seller or its 
representative prior to performance of the services). 
97 See, e.g., N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 429(3) (“If the seller refuses within the period 
prescribed by subdivision one to return all payments made by the buyer, he shall be liable 
to the buyer for the said payments and if the buyer is successful in his action therefor or 
appeal thereon, the court shall award him one hundred dollars plus reasonable attorney’s 
fees and costs, in addition to such payments.”). 
98 See 16 C.F.R. § 429.2. 
99 See id. 
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include exceptions for “fairs,” 100  “catalogue sales,” 101  and  
“auctions.”102 Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin are the only states 
that expressly exempt auctions. 103  However, these general  
exceptions for auctions have no counterpart in the federal rule.104 
Therefore, consumers would continue to have a right to withdraw 
from contracts with auctioneers under the federal regulation.105 
Second, in contrast to the federal rule, the state approach to the 
notice requirement is much more remedial. Of the states that require 
notice of the right to withdraw,106 seven expressly provide that the 
contract is void and unenforceable for lack of notice. 107  
Additionally, while the FTC has repeatedly decided not to penalize 
the seller for noncompliance with the notice requirement, thirty-
eight states provide that the cooling-off period does not begin to run 
 
100 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.021(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2018) (A door-to-door sale 
“does not include a sale, lease, or rental made at any fair.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-
640(c)(1)(G) (2018) (statute does not apply to a sale “that occurs on the state fairgrounds”); 
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 83.710(2)(g) (LexisNexis 2018) (statute does not apply to “a sale 
of arts and crafts at a fair”); 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-2(3)(vi) (2018) (statute does not apply 
to a sale “that involves arts and crafts sold at fairs”). 
101 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2711.1(A)(1) (2018) (statute does not apply to “a 
catalogue sale”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-61.5 (LexisNexis 2018) (“This section does 
not apply to  . . .  catalog sales where an order is placed by mail or telephone.”); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 423.201(2) (LexisNexis 2018) (“‘Consumer approval transaction’ does not include 
a catalog sale that is not accompanied by any other solicitation or a consumer loan 
conducted and consummated entirely by mail.”). 
102 See infra note 103. 
103 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325G.06 Subd. 2(5) (2018) (home solicitation does not include 
“a sale by public auction”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.21(F)(6) (LexisNexis 2018) 
(“‘Consumer goods or services’ does not include  . . .  [t]he sale of property at an auction 
by an auctioneer licensed by the department of agriculture under Chapter 4707 of the 
Revised Code.”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 423.201(1) (“‘Consumer approval transaction’ means 
a consumer transaction other than a sale or lease or listing for sale of real property or a sale 
of goods at auction.”). 
104 See 16 C.F.R. § 429. 
105 See, e.g., Miriam H. Sheline, Home Solicitation Sales Act, in Ohio Consumer Law § 
3:5 (Thomson Reuters ed., 2018–2019). But see 16 C.F.R. § 429.3(a) (providing an 
exception for auction of motor vehicles under the Rule). 
106 Forty-eight states require mandatory language that explains the buyer’s right to cancel 
in addition to oral notice. Alaska and Georgia are the only exceptions. See ALASKA STAT. 
§ 45.02.350 (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-6 (2018). 
107 See ALASKA STAT. § 45.02.35; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-5004(B) (2018); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 42-135a (2018); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 555A.1–555A.6 (2018); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 51-18-04 (2018); 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-4(a) (2018); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE 
ANN. § 601.201 (LexisNexis 2018). 
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until actual notice is given to the buyer.108 In these states the cool-
ing-off period becomes indefinite without notice.109 As a result, con-
sumers in these states may cancel long after services have been per-
formed and sellers will still have to bear the burdens of  
these costs.110 
These robust state-level protections take into account that sellers 
can include notice of the withdrawal right in all contracts signed off 
premises in order to limit the timeframe of the cooling-off period.111 
The California Court of Appeals noted: “If this result appears to deal 
harshly with merchants who have fully performed under their  
contracts, it seems clear to this court that the message which the 
Legislature has attempted to convey . . . is ‘Caveat Vendor.’”112 
II. INTERSECTION OF ART AUCTIONS WITH U.S. RIGHTS OF 
WITHDRAWAL 
A. Art Is Not a Commodity and Exists in an “Economic 
Microcosm” 
While U.S. rights of withdrawal are context-specific to door-to-
door sales, these rules are not market-specific.113 As a result, these 
rights are over-inclusive and pose a threat to the stability of the art 
 
108 See e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1689.7(g) (Deering 2018) (“Until the seller has complied 
with this section the buyer may cancel the home solicitation contract or offer.”). For a 
comprehensive list see infra Appendix A. 
109 See, e.g., Weatherall Aluminum Prods. Co. v. Scott, 71 Cal. App. 3d 245, 247 (1977) 
(holding defendant homeowner retained their right to withdraw because notice of the 
buyer’s cancellation right was not given, thus defendant was permitted to cancel a home 
improvement contract over a year after services were performed). Alabama is the only state 
that statutorily caps the buyer’s extended right to withdraw to one year. ALA. CODE § 5-19-
12 (LexisNexis 2018). Colorado also caps the buyer’s extended right to withdraw to three 
years when notice requirements have not been met. COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3-403(3) (2018). 
110 See Weatherall Aluminum Prods. Co., 71 Cal. App. 3d at 247. In one extreme case, 
an Ohio court permitted cancellation nearly six years after the contract was signed. See 
Knight v. Colazzo, No. 24110, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 5521, at **12 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). 
111 Weatherall Aluminum Prods. Co., 71 Cal. App. 3d at 249. 
112 Id. (emphasis added). “Caveat vendor” is a play on the phrase “caveat emptor,” or 
“buyer beware.” Essentially, this term inverts the principle that the buyer should be 
responsible for due diligence prior to a sale and assigns that responsibility to the seller. 
113 See supra Part I.A. 
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market. 114  Application of these rights to the auction of art is  
particularly problematic because art is a unique non-commodity and 
“exist[s] in an economic microcosm seemingly unbound by many 
traditional free market principles.”115 
Art is not a commodity in the sense that coffee and computers 
are commodities. It is not mass-produced or fungible. 116  
Importantly, the price of art is highly subjective, unlike commodities 
that are valued in terms of material, labor, and production.117 Art is 
distinguishable from common consumer goods by the intangible 
factors that determine an artwork’s price.118  Valuation primarily  
depends on authenticity, provenance, 119  and uniqueness, 120  in  
addition to historical context and condition.121 Secondary factors 
that impact price include the social dynamics of both collecting and 
auctions—for instance, current market trends and personal  
motivations, such as taste, competition, and desire for prestige or 
publicity.122 Importantly, the value of art is also largely dependent 
on prior sales.123 For example, art that fails to sell is considered 
“burnt,” and as a result loses significant market value.124 
 
114 See supra Part I.A. 
115 See Sebastian Harter-Bachmann, Truth in Art and Law: Allocating the Risks 
Associated With Attribution in the Art Auction House, DURHAM E-THESES, DURHAM U. 9 
(2007), available at http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/2411/ [https://perma.cc/H3W7-Y3X5]; see 
also Hunter S. Higgins, A Tale of Tulips: A Counterpoint to Courts Codifying Collectibles, 
10 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 223, 227–28 (2017). 
116 See generally SMITH, supra note 11, at 28; Higgins, supra note 115, at 228. 
117 See Harter-Bachmann, supra note 115, at 9. 
118 See Henri Neuendorf, Art Demystified: What Determines an Artwork’s Value?, 
ARTNET (June 29, 2016), https://news.artnet.com/market/art-demystified-artworks-value-
533990 [https://perma.cc/DRE6-YWND]. 
119 Provenance refers to the origins and history of ownership of a work of art, which can 
ideally be traced back to the artist. See PATTY GERSTENBLITH, ART, CULTURAL HERITAGE, 
AND THE LAW 385 (3d ed. 2012). Provenance research in addition to connoisseurship and 
scientific testing can help confirm the authenticity of a work of art. See id. 
120 Much like in the real estate market, art “[m]arket participants notably resist notions of 
substitution, often refusing to qualify any one-of-a-kind item as ‘reasonably 
interchangeable’ with another.” Higgins, supra note 115, at 228. 
121 See Harter-Bachmann, supra note 115, at 6–9. 
122 See SMITH, supra note 11, at 39. 
123 See id. at 3. 
124 See generally BI Report, supra note 2. 
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These subjective and idiosyncratic factors make an artwork’s 
valuation extremely sensitive to reputation.125  For instance, if a  
consignor or winning bidder “cools off” after the auction and  
exercises their right to withdraw, the cancelled sale can cause the 
artwork’s value to depreciate by as much as 55%.126 
Further, art’s rarity and intangible aspects create dramatic shifts 
in supply and demand, which render prices even more volatile.127 
The opportunity to sell a piece of art arises relatively rarely because 
there is such a small supply of art on the market and a small group 
with sufficient resources to purchase these often expensive works.128 
Due to this limited exchange market for art, perhaps the most  
important function auction houses serve is to carefully arrange for 
the supply of and demand for art to meet.129 Therefore, inflated  
demand by bidders or inflated supply by consignors at auction 
through bad-faith contracts will cause dramatic fluctuations  
in price.130 This economic analysis must be a part of the court’s, reg-
ulator’s, and legislature’s decisions to apply rights of withdrawal to 
art auctions.131 
B. Overview of Auction House Transactions 
This Note focuses on the impact of withdrawal rights on the art 
market within the context of the auction house because auctions are 
a significant and transparent forum for setting the value of art in an 
otherwise ambiguous market. 132  This Section will clarify the  
disadvantages of extending withdrawal rights to the auction of art 
by outlining the contractual framework at auction, auction house 
transactions at issue, and the services which auction houses provide. 
 
125 See Harter-Bachmann, supra note 115, at 7. 
126 See Alan Beggs & Kathryn Graddy, Failure to Meet the Reserve Price: The Impact 
on Returns to Art, CTR. ECON. POL’Y RES., July 2006, at 28, https://ssrn.com/
abstract=936971 [https://perma.cc/SR6C-2KG7]. 
127 See SMITH, supra note 11, at 28. 
128 See Harter-Bachmann, supra note 115, at 7. 
129 See id. 
130 Valentin, supra note 7; see also Sánchez Abril, supra note 1 (cooling-off period 
“legislation would invite bad-faith contracts, that is to say, orders signed by a purchaser 
with the full intention of canceling the order the next day”.). 
131 See supra Part I.A.2. 
132 See Harter-Bachmann, supra note 115, at 9. 
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1. Contractual Framework at Auction 
Auction houses are trading platforms where sellers and buyers 
exchange art.133 However, in establishing this arrangement, both 
sellers and buyers of art enter a contractual relationship as buyers 
from the auction house.134 The seller, or consignor, consigns their 
goods as part of a contract to purchase the auctioneer’s services 
called a consignment agreement and thereby also subscribes to the 
conditions of sale published in the auction catalogue.135 The buyer, 
or winning bidder, contracts with the auction house for the purchase 
of the auction lot.136 The bidder’s contract is formed once their offer 
to purchase has been accepted “by the fall of the hammer” on the 
auction block. 137  The winning bidder is subject to the buyer’s  
invoice and is also bound by the conditions of sale.138 Because both 
consignors and winning bidders qualify as buyers, they may have 
rights of withdrawal against the seller, the auction house.139 
2. Auction House Transactions at Issue 
Most transactions with an auction house could qualify as  
personal solicitations at locations other than the seller’s trade  
premises because art transactions—at auction houses in particular—
are built on relationships.140  Auction house art specialists141  are  
often invited to visit clients at home to offer free appraisals or advice 
on conservation, and may take advantage of these encounters to  
discuss new consignments and to gauge interest in potential  
 
133 WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 31. 
134 BRIAN W. HARVEY & FRANKLIN MEISEL, AUCTION LAW AND PRACTICE 189 (3d ed. 
2006). 
135 Id. Consignment agreements outline the terms of sale for each consignment and 
provides that the auction house is an agent of the seller. See WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 
34. 
136 See HARVEY & MEISEL, supra note 134, at 189–90. 
137 Id. at 190. 
138 See id. at 189–90. 
139 Granted that the sale was personally solicited, agreed to away from the seller’s 
business premises, and intended for personal use. See supra Part I. 
140 See Anna Rohleder, Which Auction House Is Right for You?, FORBES (Nov. 14, 2001, 
12:01 AM), https://www.forbes.com/2001/11/14/1114connguide.html#123103b83f3b 
[https://perma.cc/W5ZR-M4S3]. 
141 Specialists are professionals with advanced degrees in a particular field, such as post-
modern and contemporary art. WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 12. 
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purchases.142 The personal interaction during these home visits may 
be perceived as solicitations and result in contracts signed  
away from the business premises that inadvertently give rise to  
cancellation rights.143 
In addition, auctions are formally open to the public, but  
consignors and winning bidders will necessarily be limited to the 
very small pool of people that have the resources to trade in art,  
antiques, and unique collectibles.144 This pool includes art dealers, 
arts institutions, and private art collectors.145 Notably, purchases by 
art dealers for resale and museums for exhibition qualify as  
purchases for “business purposes.”146 As such, those transactions 
will not be covered by withdrawal rights.147 The right of withdrawal 
only applies to consumer goods or services used “primarily for  
personal, family or household purposes.”148 However, it may be  
difficult to determine if the purchase was for business or personal 
purposes where prolific collectors are concerned, especially if their 
primary motivation for the purchase is profit or investment.149 
Auction-house sales occur through either public auction or  
private sales.150 A public auction is open to anyone with resources 
to purchase and may be held live in the auction salesroom or 
online.151 A private sale is targeted to a select group and may be ne-
gotiated one-on-one or auctioned.152 Because private sales are gen-
erally conducted at the auction firm, these transactions are not 
 
142 See Judith H. Dobrzynski, How Auction Houses Orchestrate Sales for Maximum 
Drama, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/arts/design/
how-auction-houses-orchestrate-sales-for-maximum-drama.html 
[https://perma.cc/D7MZ-VBP6]. 
143 See generally, e.g., Vom Lehn v. Astor Art Galleries, Ltd., 380 N.Y.S.2d 532 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1976). 
144 SMITH, supra note 11, at 69. 
145 Id. 
146 See, e.g., Holm v. Berner, No. 06-CA-140, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 3148, ¶¶ 13–14 
(Ohio Ct. App. June 29, 2007) (finding that a purchase by Berner’s Auction Gallery for 
purposes of resale is not within the scope of the Ohio Home Solicitation Sales Act as it was 
not for purposes that were primarily personal, family, or household use). 
147 See id. 
148 See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 429.0(b). 
149 MARTIN WILSON, ART LAW AND THE BUSINESS OF ART 116 (2019). 
150 See id. at 178; see also RALPH CASSADY, AUCTIONS AND AUCTIONEERING 8 (1967). 
151 See WILSON, supra note 149, at 59–60. 
152 See SMITH, supra note 11, at 15–16. 
830          FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.            [Vol. XXX:805 
 
within the scope of withdrawal rights in off-premises contracts.153 
However, public auctions may be subject to withdrawal rights if the 
sale was personally solicited by the auctioneer, the contract  
was signed off-premises, and the purchase was intended for  
personal use.154 
There are several ways to bid at an auction, and the manner in 
which the bidder opts to place their bid may influence whether the 
contract between the auction house and the winning bidder will be 
subject to withdrawal rights in off-premises contracts.155 A bid may 
be offered (1) live in the auction room, (2) over the phone,  
(3) online, (4) through an absentee bid,156 or (5) via an agent.157 
Bidding in the auction room, via agent or directly, will not fall 
under the right of withdrawal because the contract is concluded 
when the hammer comes down and at that moment the buyer is on 
the premises of the salesroom floor.158 Clearly, signing a contract at 
the seller’s business location is not within the scope of the off- 
premises withdrawal right. 159  Moreover, while on its face the  
atmosphere of an auction salesroom may apply pressure on  
consumers to buy,160 legal intervention to protect consumers from 
this type of psychological pressure would not be legitimate market 
correction.161 This buyer is merely carried away by excitement— 
 
153 Maggie Hoag, Christie’s Inc., Address at the Cardozo Art Law Society & FAME 
Center Annual Symposium: From Consignment to the Auction Block (Mar. 25, 2019). 
154 See supra Part I. 
155 WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 98–99. 
156 Bidding by absentee bid gives permission to the auction house to bid on behalf of a 
client up to a specific price limit. Id. at 98–99. 
157 Id. Bidding via agent can be completed over the phone, online, or live bidding in the 
auction room. See id. 
158 HARVEY & MEISEL, supra note 134, at 190. 
159 See supra Part I. 
160 HARVEY & MEISEL, supra note 134, at 11; see also CHARLES HAMILTON, AUCTION 
MADNESS: AN UNCENSORED LOOK BEHIND THE VELVET DRAPES OF THE GREAT AUCTION 
HOUSES 13–15 (1981) (describing “bidder’s fever” as a wave of competition that 
overcomes bidders at auction and results in a purchase simply for the sake of self-
aggrandizement rather than out of an earnest desire for the particular auction lot or 
economically rational thought process). 
161 Gerald Spindler, Internet-Auctions Versus Consumer Protection: The Case of the 
Distance Selling Directive, 6 GERMAN L.J. 725, 730 (2005) (“[T] here is no room for 
protecting consumers due to the psychological pressures during an auction.”). 
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not contracting by mistake or under the pressure of coercive  
sales tactics.162 
For bidders (or agents of bidders) on the phone or online, the 
contract will likely qualify as executed off-premises.163 While states 
vary on whether phone or mail sales are subject to withdrawal rights, 
the majority include telephone sales in their statutes.164 
Absentee bidding is ambiguous as to whether it qualifies as on 
or off-premises. This Note assumes that these sales take place at the 
seller’s business premises, since the auction house places the bid on 
behalf of their client.165 Therefore, this Note accepts that they are 
not subject to rights of withdrawal.166 
In sum, there are two types of off-premises contracts with  
auction houses that could come under rights of withdrawal: 
 A contract between the auction house and a 
consignor who is purchasing for personal use, 
where the auctioneer personally solicited the sale 
and executed the contract at a location other than 
the auctioneer’s business premises; and 
  A contract between the auction house and a 
winning bidder who is purchasing for personal 
use, where the bid was personally solicited by the 
auctioneer and placed by the bidder during a 
public auction over the phone, by mail, or online 
in a jurisdiction which does not provide an 
exception for phone or mail sales.167 
 
162 See id. 
163 Arguably, online purchases, like door-to-door sales, are concluded in the home. See 
Mattioli, supra note 30, at 233. In addition, courts have found that agreements made over 
the phone were concluded at the consumer’s home, rather than the seller’s place of 
business. See Pritzker v. Krishna Gallery of Asian Arts, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14398, at 
*1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1996); People v. Toomey, 157 Cal. App. 3d 1, 13–14 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1984); Brown v. Martinelli, 419 N.E.2d 1081, 1082 (Ohio 1981). 
164 See infra Appendix A. 
165 WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 98–99. 
166 See supra Part I. 
167 Provided that no prior negotiations took place at the business premises. See, e.g., 16 
C.F.R. § 429.0(a)(1) (2020). 
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3. From Consignment to Auction Block 
Auction houses invest substantial time and money in preparing 
a sale. Generally, it takes an auction house three to six months after 
consignment to sell a work of art.168 Yet, if the consignor or winning 
bidder were to “cool off,” the auctioneer would lose the benefit of 
the time and resources invested into preparing the sale because 
rights of withdrawal require the seller to bear the expense of services 
that have already been performed.169 
The cost of auctioning an artwork accrues as soon as auction 
houses specialists source and vet the work for inclusion in the  
auction.170 Specialists travel around the world to scout property,  
perform scholarly research on authenticity and ownership, prepare 
sales estimates, and pitch sales and marketing plans to clients in their 
effort to secure a consignment. 171  In signing a consignment  
agreement, the auction house commits to provide expert attribution, 
restoration, and extensive marketing. 172  After consignment, but 
prior to the auction, the auction house will design detailed  
catalogues with original photography and significant art historical 
research to promote the sale.173 Advertising campaigns may also  
include videos highlighting the work and pop-up exhibitions in  
different countries. 174  Thus, marketing costs can include  
 
168 See NOAH HOROWITZ, ART OF THE DEAL: CONTEMPORARY ART IN A GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL MARKET 170 (2011). 
169 See supra Part I.B. 
170 WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 156. 
171 See id. at 41, 89; see also Harter-Bachmann, supra note 115, at 10–11, 19, 23–24 (pre-
sale estimates rely on scholarly research regarding attribution and authenticity that may 
include historical evidence, connoisseurship, scientific examination). 
172 See HARVEY & MEISEL, supra note 134, at 9. 
173 See WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 42. 
174 See id. at 42. Importantly, during the preview period, at the pop-up exhibitions or the 
auction salesroom, potential bidders have the opportunity to conduct due diligence and 
become informed about the nature of the property and the consequences of the contract. Id. 
at 11. For an extraordinary example of the work involved in preparing a work for sale 
consider how Christie’s went above and beyond their typical marketing plan to generate 
global interest for the sale of Leonardo Da Vinci’s painting, Salvator Mundi. Among other 
prep work, Christie’s hired an outside marketing firm, toured the painting around the world 
for exhibitions in major cities, and created a video on the painting that went viral. See, e.g., 
Eric Rhoads, The Ultimate Power of Branding: Why a Da Vinci Sold for $450.3 Million, 
ART MARKETING (Nov. 27, 2017), https://artmarketing.com/2017/11/27/ultimate-power-
branding-leonardo-da-vinci-sold-450-3-million/ [https://perma.cc/Y2HV-474A]. 
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transportation, insurance, and photography. 175  Finally, auction 
houses are also responsible for preparing and curating salesrooms 
and exhibition spaces.176 
If the right of withdrawal were applied to art auctions,  
auctioneers would be forced to absorb all of these costs in the event 
of a cancelled sale.177  However, auction houses are, after all, a  
conduit between consignors and bidders, and it would therefore be 
reasonable for auctioneers to spread these sunk costs to  
consumers.178 For example, auction houses could recoup the costs 
of administering returns by increasing their commission fees to  
consignors and increasing the buyer’s premium.179 Thus, consumers 
may ultimately bear the cost of their own protection.180 
C. U.S. Rights of Withdrawal Could Apply to the Sale of Art at 
Auction 
Clearly, extension of the withdrawal right to art auctions would 
profoundly affect the manner in which art is transferred.181 Thus, 
this Section will examine whether there is a plausible reading of the 
regulatory and statutory texts or common law that would, in fact, 
apply rights of withdrawal to art auctions. 
1. Read Literally, Withdrawal Rights Could Plausibly 
Encompass Art Auctions 
When construed literally the text of U.S. cooling-off rules  
indicates auctions are within the scope of the rules. The fact that 
several states created specific exceptions for auctions indicates that 
these legislatures understood the rights of withdrawal to apply to 
auctions. 182  Moreover, if the drafters in other states omit this  
exception—particularly, when they are readily found in other,  
similar laws or regulations—the strongest conclusion is that these 
 
175 See WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 42. 
176 See id. at 157. 
177 See supra Part I.B. 
178 See Rekaiti & Van den Bergh, supra note 1, at 374. 
179 See id. 
180 See id. 
181 See supra Parts II.A., II.B. 
182 See MINN. STAT. § 325G.06 Subd. 2(5) (2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.21(F)(6) 
(LexisNexis 2018); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 423.201(1) (LexisNexis 2018). 
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drafters intended the omission.183 Therefore, other state statutes’ 
failure to exclude auctions with other enumerated exceptions184  
suggests that these legislatures intended the scope of the consumer 
protection statute to cover auctions.185 
The administrative history of the federal regulation also  
explicitly includes auctions within the scope of the rules. In adopting 
the 1995 amendments to the federal regulation, the FTC stated that 
the Rule applies to public auctions, provided that the auctioneer is 
directly selling goods or services to buyers.186 Arguably, art auction 
houses meet this definition because they function as a conduit  
between consignors and bidders such that they are direct sellers of 
auctioneer services to consignors and they are direct sellers of  
artwork to bidders.187 
However, statutory interpretation requires that courts read rules 
in a manner consistent with their intended purpose.188 Here, despite 
the literal reading of withdrawal rights, the purpose of these rules 
suggest they were not intended to cover art auctions. Importantly, 
the primary target for door-to-door sellers are senior citizens, new 
immigrants, and low-income families who are largely isolated by 
economic, physical, and cultural immobility. 189  This consumer 
lacks access to alternative markets for goods and services and is par-
ticularly susceptible to pressure by door-to-door sellers.190 Whereas, 
the consumer advocate at auction would at most be concerned about 
 
183 The expressio unius canon of statutory interpretation provides that the enumeration of 
specific items in a statute purposely exclude items not listed. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET 
AL., LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 668 
(5th ed. 2014). 
184 See infra Appendix A. 
185 See ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 183, at 668. 
186 See 1988 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Final Exemptions, supra note 76, at 45457–58 n.10, 
n.23. 
187 See supra Part II.B.1. 
188 “[T]he reason and spirit of the law and the cause which induced the legislature to enact 
it may be considered to discover its true meaning.” Gray v. Admin. Dir. of the Court, 931 
P.2d 580, 590 n.15 (Haw. 1997). 
189 Concurring Statement of Commissioner Julie Brill, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Federal 
Trade Commission Trade Regulation Rule Concerning Cooling-Off Period for Sales Made 
at Homes or at Certain Other Locations (the “Cooling-Off Rule”) (Jan. 6, 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/617121/150106coolingoff
statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/L94F-GUCM]. 
190 See id. 
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the bidder who is a novice art collector and is confused by the valu-
ation of art or the consignor who is an art-world outsider trying to 
access the monetary value of a deceased relative’s estate.191 Clearly, 
there are fundamental differences in both the relative sophistication 
of contracting parties and in the procedures by which art is sold and 
how other door-to-door sales are conducted, which suggest that the 
consumer is not as vulnerable in art transactions. 
To begin with, although both bidders and consignors may feel 
reliant on the auction house for expertise regarding the deal, they are 
sophisticated parties with bargaining power against the auction 
house.192 In addition, any pressure on the consignor to sign the  
contract in time for their work to be listed in an upcoming auction is 
internal and not created by the demand for an immediate response 
to the seller. 193  The decision to consign is not made on the  
doorstep. 194  Customarily, consignors have time to conduct due  
diligence, comparison shop, and negotiate these high-value  
transactions. 195  Further, while auction-goers can exhibit an irra-
tional behavior known as “bidder’s fever” that may compel a person 
to bid more than they would have in a more deliberative state of 
mind,196 these transactions take place on the business premises thus 
are not within the scope of withdrawal rights.197 Finally, home visits 
by an auction house are made at the invitation of the client, thus 
there is no surprise element.198 Therefore, application of withdrawal 
rights to art auctions would be contrary to the intended purpose of 
these rules to protect vulnerable consumers from coercive  
sales tactics. 
Moreover, a common-sense reading of the text would suggest 
that these cooling-off rules were not intended to cover such disparate 
markets as art transactions and typical door-to-door sales. For  
example, the FTC’s “Statement of Basis and Purpose” shows that 
 
191 See Neuendorf, supra note 118. 
192 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 1020 (2007). 
193 See WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 114, 117 (discussing how consignors comparison 
shop between different auction houses). 
194 See id. 
195 See id. 
196 HAMILTON, supra note 160, at 13–15. 
197 See infra Part II.B.2. 
198 See Dobrzynski, supra note 142. 
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the regulation was contemplated for relatively minor purchases from 
unscrupulous traveling salesmen selling encyclopedia subscriptions 
and vacuum cleaners in low-income areas. 199  Clearly, these  
transactions differ vastly from the $45 billion global art market 
where auction houses hold roughly 40% of the market share and 
even “low-end” goods have significant price tags.200 Withdrawal 
rights as a remedy also presuppose that the amount in controversy 
does not justify the legal expense.201 While it is true that litigation 
might be impractical for minor purchases, that cannot be said for 
high-value, unique transactions like art. Indeed, the value of  
contracts in the art market often justify litigation.202 Thus, consumer 
advocates cannot claim the same plausible application of withdrawal 
rights to art auctions in comparison to typical door-to-door sales. 
2. Caselaw Plausibly Suggests that Withdrawal Rights Could 
Apply in Art Auctions 
There are a limited number of withdrawal right cases dealing 
with art and auctions from which to draw guidance.203 Perhaps this 
is because withdrawal rights have not been contemplated as  
applying to this market, which may change as its use becomes more 
well known in Europe.204 Another reason could be that these matters 
are settled outside of court, or maybe consumers are simply not  
motivated to purchase based on increased consumer confidence on 
the back of withdrawal rights.205 
 
199 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31, at 22936. 
200 See RACHEL A.J. POWNALL, TEFAF ART MARKET REPORT 2017 11 (The European 
Fine Art Foundation 2017). 
201 Proponents of withdrawal rights argue that it is an appropriate remedy because it 
provides rescission without resort to costly litigation. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 
27, at 239; see also Brittenham, et al., supra note 30, at 1031. 
202 Even a perceived loss in market value after a failed auction has acted as part of the 
basis for legal proceedings. See, e.g., Cristallina S.A. v. Christie, Manson & Woods Int’l, 
Inc., 502 N.Y.S.2d 165, 171 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986). 
203 Notably, the majority of cases invoking the right to withdraw involve corrupt sales 
practices in the home improvement industry. See infra Appendix B. 
204 A 1968 U.C.L.A. empirical study of cooling-off rules suggests that consumers do not 
even know about this consumer protection device, which could explain why consumers do 
not invoke this right. Sánchez Abril et al., supra note 1, at 18. 
205 In a 2014 study of the efficacy of cooling-off rules, 58% of sellers surveyed believed 
that cooling-off periods most likely do not incentivize sales to occur that would not have 
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The relevant cases show that courts have applied the right to 
withdraw to contracts with art galleries.206 However, buyers have 
yet to succeed in invoking the right against an auction house.207  
Nevertheless, looking at consumer transactions with auction houses 
objectively in terms of the legal requirements for withdrawal 
rights 208  a court could plausibly find these contracts subject to  
cancellation as a result of the overly broad language of the cooling-
off rules, as well as the fact that courts tend to disregard the unique 
nature of art.209 
To start with, looking at the indiscriminate terms of the  
withdrawal rights, auction houses may qualify as “sellers.”210 A 
“seller” is typically defined as “any person, partnership, corporation, 
or association engaged in the door-to-door sale of consumer goods 
or services.” 211  Thus, the scope of the term “seller” depends  
upon the meaning of “door-to-door sales” and “consumer goods  
and services.”212 
The auction house specialist’s home visits to clients may qualify 
as “door-to-door sales” because they involve personal solicitation 
 
otherwise happened. See Sovern, supra note 13, at 367. But see MULHOLLAND, supra note 
50, at 22 (noting that impulse buys are encouraged by the right to withdraw). 
206 See Pritzker v. Krishna Gallery of Asian Arts, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14398, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1996); Vom Lehn v. Astor Art Galleries, Ltd., 380 N.Y.S.2d 532, 532 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976). 
207 See Morris v. Steffes Grp., Inc., 924 N.W.2d 491, 496–97 (Iowa 2019), reh’g denied, 
(Mar. 28, 2019); see generally Vaks v. Ryan, 2012 Mass. App. Div. 17 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 
2012), award vacated, 2014 Mass. App. Div. 37 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2014); Holm v. Berner, 
No. 06-CA-140, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 3148 (Ohio Ct. App. June 29, 2007). 
208 Statutory requirements include particular definitions for the seller, goods and services, 
in addition to the requirements of minimum purchase price and personal solicitation by the 
seller at a location other than the seller’s business premises. See supra Part I.B. 
209 See generally Pritzker, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14398; Vom Lehn, 380 N.Y.S.2d 532. 
210 As noted earlier, auction houses are direct sellers of auctioneer services to consignors 
and they are direct sellers of artwork to bidders. See supra Part II.B.1. Auctioneering 
services are within the scope of withdrawal rights in most jurisdictions. See infra Appendix 
A. At present, aside from Minnesota, Ohio and Wisconsin, there is no general carve-out 
for the auction industry. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325G.06 Subd. 2(5) (2018); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 1345.21(F)(6) (LexisNexis 2018); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 423.201(1) 
(LexisNexis 2018). 
211 See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 429.0(c). 
212 Morris, 924 N.W.2d at 496–97. 
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away from the seller’s business premises. 213  For example, in  
Pritzker v. Krishna Gallery of Asian Arts, Krishna Nathan  
personally solicited the sale of the “Kubera,” an antique Indian  
sandstone sculpture, during a visit to the buyer’s home.214 Likewise, 
in Vom Lehn v. Astor Art Galleries, the buyers first discussed the 
Ming Dynasty jade carvings with the seller over dinner and drinks, 
and later returned to the buyer’s home where the sellers personally 
solicited the sale.215 
Finally, by treating art like a mere commodity courts have  
overlooked its unique nature, and consequently, easily found that 
artworks meet the definition of “consumer goods” under cooling-off 
period rules.216  In Krishna Gallery of Asian Arts, buyers of the  
Kubera contended that the sculpture was inauthentic and sought to 
cancel the sale agreement with an art gallery based on the New York 
State right-of-withdrawal statute. 217  Without any discussion, the 
court concluded that the Kubera was a consumer good within the 
meaning of the statute.218 Similarly, in Astor Art Galleries, a buyer 
invoked the same statute to cancel the sale of inauthentic Ming  
Dynasty jade carvings bought from a gallery.219 The court found that 
the jade carvings satisfied the definition of consumer goods as items 
“primarily for personal, family or household purposes”; thus, they 
were within the scope of the law.220 
 
213 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31, at 22936 
(“Personal contact between the salesman and the customer in the home of the buyer is the 
dominant characteristic of the door-to-door sale.”). 
214 See Pritzker, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14398, at *6. 
215 See Vom Lehn, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 536. 
216 See generally, e.g., Pritzker, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14398; Vom Lehn, 380 N.Y.S.2d 
532. 
217 Pritzker, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14398, at *1 (holding summary judgement was 
inappropriate due to a genuine issue of material fact regarding where the contract was 
formed; plaintiff buyer argued the offer to purchase was made over the phone at their 
Illinois home, defendant seller argued the offer to purchase was made at the gallery 
warehouse, i.e. the seller’s business premises). 
218 Id. at *6. 
219 Vom Lehn, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 542 (holding plaintiff buyer could cancel the contract at 
any time because the transaction met the statutory definition of door-to-door sales and 
notice requirements were not adhered to by the sellers). 
220 Id. 
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Morris v. Steffes Group, Inc. provides more in-depth authority 
on the scope of a local consumer protection statute’s definition of 
“consumer goods or services” in the context of an auction, albeit not 
an art auction.221 There, the Supreme Court of Iowa found that there 
is no objective limitation on the terms “goods or services” other than 
the buyer’s primary purpose for the purchase: “nothing in the statute 
categorically declares any goods or services outside the scope of the 
statute based on their inherent quality.”222  Thus, the dispositive 
question is whether the goods or services are “consumer” in  
nature.223 Accordingly, as long as a consignor or winning bidder’s 
purpose in buying auction services or an auction lot is “primarily for 
personal, family or household purposes,” the right to withdraw will 
apply.224 Taken together, these cases suggest that withdrawal rights 
could apply to goods such as art and services such as auctioneer-
ing.225 
However, there are strong arguments for treating art differently 
than a mere consumer good or commodity. Art law professor Patty 
Gerstenblith argues that art is distinguishable from ordinary  
commodities in two important ways. 226  First, the value of art  
fluctuates rapidly because it is governed by the particularities of the 
art trade.227 For example, there are practical consequences to an  
artwork’s value that flow from a cancelled sale: its devaluation.228 
Second, art is unique, much like real estate,229 and real estate is  
generally exempt from withdrawal rights.230 
 
221 Morris v. Steffes Grp., Inc., 924 N.W.2d 491, 496–97 (Iowa 2019) (holding that the 
state consumer protection statute may cover the auction of a tractor if the buyer’s purpose 
was “primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.”). 
222 Id. at 499. Moreover, this broad definition of “consumer goods and services” shows 
an intent to exclude only those transactions motivated by business purposes based on the 
assumption that those transactions involve less vulnerable parties, who do not need the 
safeguards of consumer protection law. Id. at 500. 
223 See id. 
224 See id. at 501. 
225 See id. 
226 See GERSTENBLITH, supra note 119, at 339. 
227 See id. 
228 See generally BI Report, supra note 2. 
229 See GERSTENBLITH, supra note 119, at 339. 
230 See, e.g., FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31, at 
22948 (real estate sales “would not fall within the scope of the definition of consumer 
goods or services.”). However, the federal rule and seventeen states also explicitly exclude 
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In addition, the case law further supports the argument that art 
should be exempt from withdrawal rights. In particular, both 
Krishna Gallery of Asian Arts and Astor Art Galleries illustrate that 
there already appear to be protections in place for consumers in  
the art market that address the underlying purposes of withdrawal 
rights.231  Notably, in both of these cases the determining factor  
was the seller’s misrepresentation of the authenticity of the  
goods.232 Therefore, both matters could have simply been resolved 
with the application of New York’s specific art market  
legislation, 233  or under claims such as breach of warranty or  
fraudulent misrepresentation.234 
Furthermore, the art market involves repeat transactions with  
sophisticated parties, which contrasts sharply with the more  
vulnerable consumers whom withdrawal rights were intended to 
protect.235  In Krishna Gallery of Asian Arts, the buyer was the  
leading collector of Asian art, as well as one of the wealthiest Amer-
icans at the time.236 He was able to hire the senior curator of Asian 
Art at the Los Angeles County Museum of Art as a consultant.237 
The court in Vaks v. Ryan suggested that withdrawal rights are not 
intended to protect such sophisticated buyers operating in the top 
 
transactions related to real property. See infra Appendix A. There may have been an 
intention to exclude real estate sales from the FTC Rule and other state withdrawal rights 
because the consumer is already protected by the customary process of these transactions 
which involve a closing period that operates very similarly to a cooling-off period. 
Similarly, in art transactions, art market specific legislation already fills the gap that 
withdrawal rights are intended to remedy. See infra Part IV.A. Like the right of withdrawal, 
art market specific legislation only applies when the seller is an art merchant and the buyer 
is not as sophisticated, as the purpose for these laws is “to protect unknowing buyers from 
knowing sellers who may try to use the unequal balance of information power to their own 
advantage.” Christie’s Inc. v. SWCA, Inc., 867 N.Y.S.2d 650, 656 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008). 
231 See, e.g., Pritzker v. Krishna Gallery of Asian Arts, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14398, at 
*1 (holding that both New York’s Door-to-Door Sales Act and New York’s specific art 
market legislation could be applied). 
232 See generally Pritzker, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *1; Vom Lehn v. Astor Art 
Galleries, Ltd., 380 N.Y.S.2d 532, 532 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976). 
233 GERSTENBLITH, supra note 119, at 405. 
234 See, e.g., Rogath v. Siebenmann, 129 F.3d 261, 262 (2d Cir. 1997) (plaintiff-buyer of 
allegedly inauthentic Francis Bacon painting brings claims of breach of warranty and fraud 
against seller). 
235 See supra Part II.C.1. 
236 GERSTENBLITH, supra note 119, at 404. 
237 Id. 
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price brackets of the art trade. 238  There, a sophisticated buyer  
controlled the lengthy negotiation process, which provided the 
buyer ample time for reflection upon the transaction.239 The court 
held that the consignor was not entitled to protection under the  
Massachusetts right of withdrawal because the statute was intended 
to protect “unwary consumers from unwelcome solicitors.”240 This 
holding implies that providing sophisticated parties free  
withdrawal is an ineffective use of consumer protection law.241 
 
238 See Vaks v. Ryan, 2012 Mass. App. Div. 17, 17 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2012). In Vaks, the 
consignors contacted about five auction houses over the course of a month to discuss 
conditions of sale for home furnishings. Id. at 17. Ultimately, Rimma Vaks consigned to 
Ryan Auction Company over 150 lots, including furniture, paintings, and rugs. Id. As the 
consignments were sold during the ensuing months, a dispute as to the commission 
percentage arose. Id. at 18. The dispute culminated in a complaint by Vaks about the 
manner in which the auction was conducted, which relied in part on a claim under the 
Massachusetts State right of withdrawal. Id. While, the court in Vaks expressed sympathy 
towards evaluating claims against the legislative purpose of protecting more vulnerable 
consumers, this argument discriminates between the relative sophistication of buyers in a 
way that may not hold up in another court. In Burke v. Yingling, for example, the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court explicitly overturned a previous ruling which reasoned that a 
sophisticated buyer who initiated contact with the seller and conducted lengthy 
negotiations over the purchase of an expensive product was not the type of consumer that 
the state’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law was meant to protect. See 
Burke v. Yingling, 666 A.2d 288, 290–91 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (reversing a grant of 
summary judgement in favor of appellee seller, as the appellant buyer of an audio-visual 
system was entitled to protection under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and 
Consumer Protection Law). In doing so the court emphasized that the statutory language 
provides a “right to cancel to all buyers even if the buyer is sophisticated, in no way 
deceived or pressured by the Seller, and takes adequate time to reflect before agreeing to 
the transaction.” Id. at 22 (emphasis added). Thus, the court declined to differentiate 
between buyers “deserving” of protection, and those not. Id. at 22. However, in a more 
recent decision specific to the art market, the court held as a matter of law that buyers in 
the top price brackets cannot rely on “information asymmetry” in claims against art 
merchants hard-selling work: “these sophisticated plaintiffs cannot demonstrate reasonable 
reliance because they conducted no due diligence.” MAFG Art Fund, LLC v. Gagosian, 
123 A.D.3d 458, 459 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (dismissing claims against the Gagosian 
Gallery for withholding information and selling artwork at an inflated price). Accordingly, 
although there is some uncertainty, a policy argument might prevail in court today. See id. 
239 See Vaks, 2012 Mass. App. Div. at 22. 
240 Id. The court also noted that the fact that the buyer had initiated contact with the seller 
factored into the decision. Id. Whereas some states provide that buyer-initiated sales are 
exempt from withdrawal rights; the Massachusetts statute does not do so. See MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 48 (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 255D, § 9 (2018). 
241 See, e.g., Vaks, 2012 Mass. App. Div. at 17. 
842          FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.            [Vol. XXX:805 
 
Lastly, the remedies attached to withdrawal rights permit  
dissatisfied consumers to receive services in full at no cost or return 
goods without covering depreciation costs.242  While these rights 
were not intended to be a “satisfaction guarantee,”243 consumers will 
attempt to use the right of withdrawal as such.244 For example, in 
Holm v. Berner the dispute arose specifically because the plaintiff 
was not satisfied with his compensation for property sold through 
an auction gallery.245 Duane Holm sold collectibles, furniture, and 
other personal property to Berner’s Auction Gallery but when he 
learned that the gallery had resold the items for considerably higher 
value, he brought suit.246 The Court of Appeals of Ohio found that 
the withdrawal right did not apply because Holm sold his property 
outright to Berner’s Auction Gallery; thus Holm was the seller and 
Berner was the buyer.247 Baring this technicality, the outcome could 
have permitted rescission of the contract and would have trans-
formed the right of withdrawal into a satisfaction-guarantee right. 
III. RIGHTS OF WITHDRAWAL UNDERMINE THE SALE OF ART AT 
AUCTION 
In his critique on the E.U. right of withdrawal, Pierre Valentin 
argued that the right to cancel is irreconcilable with the auction of 
art for three reasons.248 First, a cancelled sale reduces the market 
value of art.249 Second, consumers who can easily avoid a contract 
become more risk-friendly and bid speculatively, which drives 
 
242 See supra Part I.B. 
243 See, e.g., 1995 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Non-Substantive Amendments, supra note 50, 
at 54184 (“The Cooling-Off Rule was not intended to be a federal “satisfaction guarantee” 
requirement or “buyers’ remorse” insurance program.”). 
244 See generally Holm v. Berner, No. 06-CA-140, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 3148 (Ohio 
Ct. App. June 29, 2007). 
245 Id. at ¶¶ 1–3. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. at ¶¶ 23–24. Withdrawal rights are intended to protect the buyer, not the seller, 
thus sellers cannot invoke this right. Id. at ¶ 24. Moreover, the court found that even if 
Berner was the buyer, the goods were purchased for resale, which does not qualify as 
personal use, thus the transaction would still be excluded from the scope of the statute. Id. 
248 See Valentin, supra note 7. 
249 Id. 
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prices up and distorts published market prices.250 Third, if a buyer 
were to exercise the right to cancel, costs of the artwork’s  
depreciation and the sale preparation would revert to the seller and, 
by extension, back to consumers.251 Valentin’s critique of the E.U. 
right of withdrawal is equally applicable in the United States, as 
consumers and auctioneers face the same challenges under the  
federal and state rights of withdrawal in off-premises contracts. 
This Part will expand on these arguments in more depth as  
applied to the U.S. rights of withdrawal by arguing that the  
indiscriminate application of these rights to art auction sales would 
be inefficient and harmful. Consumer protection law should respond 
to the challenges of the specific market affected and strive to find a 
balance between consumer and market interests. 252  Therefore, 
courts, regulators, and legislatures should consider the peculiarities 
of the art market before applying the right to cancel to art auctions. 
A. Repercussions of a Cancelled Sale on the Value of the Artwork 
The right to cancel is too costly to implement in this market  
because a cancelled sale will reduce an artwork’s market value  
significantly. 253  While free withdrawal might work well for the  
minor purchases of mass-produced goods contemplated by the  
drafters,254 it fails when it comes to art, which exists in its own  
“economic microcosm.”255 “[I]n the arcane world of high-priced art, 
market value is affected by market perceptions,”256 and the art world 
considers artwork devalued—“burnt”—as a result of its failure to 
sell.257 In fact, the general assumption is that a burnt work of art has 
failed to sell because it is of “poor quality, bad condition or dubious 
 
250 Id. 
251 Id. 
252 See Bar-Gill, supra note 29, at 801–02. 
253 Cooling-off periods may be “too costly to implement—for example, when using a 
purchased good during the cooling-off period causes significant depreciation in the value 
of the good.” Camerer et al., supra note 27, at 1240. 
254 See FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31, at 22936. 
255 See Higgins, supra note 115, at 227–28. 
256 Firestone & Parson, Inc. v. Union League of Phila., 672 F. Supp. 819, 823 (E.D. Pa. 
1987). 
257 See generally BI Report, supra note 2. 
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provenance.”258 Those works that may be pulled prior to auction are 
also assumed to have uncertain ownership or authenticity.259 As a 
result, the unsold work has lost its initial appeal to buyers.260 
At auction, a cancelled sale will cause long-term material harm 
to a one-of-a-kind item’s value.261 Studies show that the average 
price of art decreases by 27–33% when it appears at auction for a 
second time.262 Statistics also show that it takes about six years for 
the market value of the burnt artwork to return to status quo ante the 
failed sale.263 In addition, consignors generally must withdraw the 
burnt work from the market for at least a year to create demand for 
it,264 but the average holding period is closer to eight years.265 Given 
that auctions regularly set record prices these depreciation costs are 
significant—losses could be in the range of hundreds of thousands, 
if not millions, of dollars.266 
By extension, a cancelled sale may also negatively impact  
the market for the artist’s entire category of work, as well as work 
by others in the same style.267 As an example of how the sales  
history for one of an artist’s pieces can impact the market for the rest 
 
258 Id. at 1. 
259 See Isaac Kaplan, Why Are Artworks Pulled from Auction?, ARTSY (July 13, 2017), 
https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-artworks-pulled-auction 
[https://perma.cc/H2L4-UDUC]. 
260 See SMITH, supra note 11, at 39. 
261 See generally BI Report, supra note 2 (noting an average decrease in value of 27%); 
see also Beggs & Graddy, supra note 126, at 28 (noting that devaluation varies enormously 
from an average decrease of 33% to as much as 55% seen in certain cases). 
262 See BI Report, supra note 2, at 2. In addition to the reduced market value of the auction 
lot, the auctioneer must also lower its commission to encourage bids. Id. 
263 See id. 
264 MERRYMAN, supra note 192, at 965. 
265 Beggs & Graddy, supra note 126, at 13 (noting that the average holding period for 
failed sale is 7.65 years). 
266 For example, if the sale of the Salvator Mundi had been cancelled, on reoffer the 
painting’s final sale price might have decreased by as much as $121.5 million, 27% of the 
over $450 million sale price. See, e.g., Leonardo’s Salvator Mundi Makes Auction History, 
CHRISTIE’S (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.christies.com/features/Leonardo-and-Post-War-
results-New-York-8729-3.aspx [https://perma.cc/G6NB-XPTU] (describing the historic 
sale of a recently discovered Leonardo Da Vinci painting, the Salvator Mundi, for 
$450,312,500). 
267 SMITH, supra note 11, at 3 (noting that the auction of Van Gogh’s Irises for over $50 
million not only set the price for that particular work, but also affected the price of all of 
Van Gogh’s work and all Post-Impressionist paintings). 
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of their works,  Christopher Wool’s And If You (1992) sold for $13.6 
million at Christie’s in 2016, a 40% drop in price when compared  
to the artist’s almost-perfect substitute If You (1992), which sold  
for $23.7 million in 2014.268 The day after the sale of the And If  
You (1992), the artist’s other word painting Untitled (1990) sold  
at Sotheby’s for a very similar price, $13.9 million.269 Given this 
ripple effect, depreciation costs can be significant and often difficult 
to calculate.270 
Even advocates for the right of withdrawal as a default rule  
admit that transactions involving goods whose value changes  
dramatically should not be included within the scope of the right, as 
withdrawal would defeat the purpose of these contracts.271 Omri 
Ben-Shahar and Eric Posner proposed an optimal contract model 
based in economic efficiency, which supports free withdrawal as a 
default rule where goods depreciate slowly, but opposes it where the 
value of the goods rapidly depreciates, depreciation is difficult to 
measure, and where the value fluctuates rapidly, such as at  
auctions.272 These scholars emphasized that the value of goods sold 
at auction are volatile; thus, auctions are a prime example of  
transactions that should be exempt from withdrawal rights. 273  
Further, cost-benefit analysis suggests that rights of withdrawal may 
not be justified in markets where the contract cannot be easily  
reversed.274 Because it is so difficult to unwind the contract for the 
winning bidder at auction, it follows that auctions are a poor fit for 
the application of the withdrawal right.275 
 
268 WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 74–75. 
269 Id. 
270 See SMITH, supra note 11, at 3. 
271 See Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 16, at 138. 
272 See id. at 138, 144. The authors also oppose the application of the right to business 
sales where the contracting parties are sophisticated. Id. at 145–46. 
273 See id. at 138. 
274 See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Happiness, Efficiency, and the Promise of Decisional Equity: 
From Outcome to Process, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 935, 987–88 (2009). 
275 See id. 
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B. Moral Hazard and Artificially Distorted Auction Prices 
The right to withdraw can trigger opportunistic behavior276 and 
welfare-reducing purchase decisions.277 In particular, the ability to 
deliberate on purchases ex post contracting during a cooling-off  
period creates an incentive for impulse buys.278 Economists describe 
this phenomenon as buyer’s opportunism, or “moral hazard.”279 
Moral hazard is when it becomes more probable that the buyer will 
behave in a morally reprehensible way because the consequences of 
the buyer’s decisions are borne by others.280 Since such opportunism 
harms contracting parties, moral hazard is one of the most  
significant arguments against the right to withdraw.281 
Given that consumers are facing significant high-value  
transactions at auctions,282 they should have an incentive to learn 
about their purchases and seek expert advice ex ante.283 As John 
Henry Merryman, a founder of the field of art law, put it: “[t]he  
prudent collector who loves art and wants to enjoy collecting  
without making unnecessary mistakes will find that much time and 
research may be required.”284 The concern is that, if the right to 
withdraw applies, consumers are protected from bearing the risks of 
a cancelled sale and therefore may choose to avoid due diligence 
costs prior to the sale. It is illogical to apply withdrawal rights in 
such a way. Rather than helping vulnerable consumers avoid a  
coercive door-to-door sale, using the withdrawal right in the art  
 
276 See Rekaiti & Van den Bergh, supra note 1, at 381. 
277 MULHOLLAND, supra note 50, at 22. 
278 Id. 
279 The term “moral hazard” finds its roots in insurance literature, which first discussed 
information problems like the moral hazard that inevitably arises when an insurance 
company cannot observe whether the insured exerts effort to prevent an accident and the 
“adverse selection” that occurs when the insured knows more than the insurer about the 
individual’s likelihood of an accident. ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC 
THEORY 477 n.1 (1995). However, there are a broad range of economic relationships that 
fit into this general framework of principal-agent problems, including auctions. 
280 See PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, CONTRACT THEORY 20 (2005) 
(“When a person gets better protection against a bad outcome, she will rationally invest 
fewer resources in trying to avoid it.”). 
281 MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 279, at 478. 
282 See POWNALL, supra note 200, at 11. 
283 Bar-Gill, supra note 29, at 758. 
284 MERRYMAN, supra note 192, at 965. 
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auction context, ostensibly to allow sophisticated art collectors an 
unfair advantage and to rid them of the expensive and time- 
consuming responsibility of due diligence, only accommodates  
regret; namely, “buyer’s remorse” and “seller’s remorse.” 
1. Effects on Bidders: Buyer’s Remorse 
Trading at auction depends on the finality of the resulting  
contracts, which withdrawal rights undermine and leave open to the 
opportunity of abuse.285 Gerald Spindler has warned that “[i]f buy-
ers are enabled to revoke their contracts after the end of an auction 
there would be no risk for a buyer in making the highest possible 
bid, thus rendering the auction a farce.”286 This risk neutrality pro-
vides an incentive for the bidder to rescind as a dominant strategy 
and to bid speculatively.287 
Without free withdrawal, the bidder must put in effort to learn 
about the item on which they bid.288 Auction houses offer services 
to bidders to overcome this information asymmetry: bidders have 
the opportunity to learn about the auction lot during the preview  
period by visiting the auction gallery or consulting with  
specialists;289 yet this costs the bidder time, energy, and money.290 
Critically the consumer is not required to justify why they seek to 
withdraw; therefore, winning bidders could save on their normal  
information costs by choosing to wait and learn about the artwork 
during the cooling-off period, and, if necessary, return it  
with buyer’s remorse. 291  In this way, the right to cancel can  
 
285 See Spindler, supra note 161, at 725. 
286 Id. 
287 Id. 
288 See BOLTON & DEWATRIPONT, supra note 280, at 129. 
289 WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 11–12. 
290 See BOLTON & DEWATRIPONT, supra note 280, at 129. 
291 “Often, parties waive the banner of freedom from contract deviously, to masquerade 
what is otherwise plain opportunistic regret. Something changed—prices went up, new 
bidders came by, the deal doesn’t look so good after all—such that a retracting party may 
seek to recapture an opportunity he gave up previously, when making a promise. Thus, for 
example, a party who made a firm offer in the hope of attracting attention from the offeree 
may seek to revoke it when a better deal was proposed by a third party.” Omri Ben-Shahar, 
Freedom From Contract, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 261, 269. 
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encourage irresponsible bidding and increase the number of  
uninformed purchases.292 
Speculative bidding also makes it more likely that the individual 
who values the auctioned item most will not obtain it.293 In auctions, 
allocative efficiency is achieved when the individual who values the 
auction lot the most wins.294 Yet, if the winner postpones learning 
about the purchase ex ante, they will have less information about the 
item’s worth than the seller or even other bidders, and is more likely 
to be disappointed by the sale.295 By facilitating this inefficiency at 
auction, the right to withdraw will harm all consumers involved in 
art auctions.296 
Additionally, the perceived interest of the bidders and the  
potential for competition at auction may create a false sense of  
demand for the work, which harms consumers by raising prices.297 
The art market is more vulnerable to manipulation than other  
markets, due to limited supply and demand.298 An auction house’s 
estimate of the selling price of the lot, and therefore its reserve or 
minimum selling price,299 is based on, among other things, esti-
mated market conditions.300 House specialists who set the estimate 
may publish inflated prices due to the false enthusiasm of bidders 
who do not intend to follow through with the sale.301 This inflated  
demand creates a market distortion where the sale price no longer 
 
292 See Spindler, supra note 161, at 725. 
293 See BOLTON & DEWATRIPONT, supra note 280, at 129. 
294 See id. at 262. 
295 See id. at 26 (discussing “winner’s curse”). 
296 See id. at 243. 
297 See SMITH, supra note 11, at 30. 
298 See id. 
299 See Andrew M. Goldstein, A Beginner’s Guide to Art Auctions, ARTSPACE (Nov. 8, 
2012), https://www.artspace.com/magazine/art_101/art_market/art_101_a_guide_to_
auction_lingo-5558 [https://perma.cc/5KRY-2FBF]. 
300 Michael McCullough, Successu Ex Machina. Making Sense of Auction Estimates, 
GALLERY INTELL, http://www.galleryintell.com/successu-ex-machina-making-sense-of-
auction-estimates/ [https://perma.cc/AWH8-DSLB]. 
301 See WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 100 (“So if specialists know the interest is strong 
[because multiple bidders have registered]  . . .  they are more likely to recommend the 
seller set a higher reserve right for the object”); see also Sánchez Abril et al., supra note 1, 
at 6 n.7 (cooling-off period “legislation would invite bad-faith contracts, that is to say, 
orders signed by a purchaser with the full intention of canceling the order the next 
day . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
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reflects the artwork’s true market value. 302  Thus, even in  
instances where the right to withdraw is not invoked, it could cause 
price inflation that results in consumers overpaying.303 
2. Effects on Consignors: Seller’s Remorse 
In like manner, the withdrawal right provides consignors with 
an improper incentive to rescind. The consignor exercising the right 
may receive a windfall if they get to both freely exit the contract and 
obtain the same payoff as though the bargain had been fully  
performed.304 For example, if the consignor were to walk away from 
an auction house after free appraisals and restoration have been done 
in preparation of the sale, then the consignor could use these services 
as a bargaining chip to sell the property with a competitor under a 
more favorable contract.305 
Further, it is feasible for consignors to exploit the right to  
withdraw in instances where they consider their consignment as 
having been sold at an undervalued purchase price. Several cases 
show consignors attempting to take advantage of the right when  
dissatisfied.306  For example, in both Vaks v. Ryan and Holm v. 
Berner, the primary motivation for the plaintiffs to rescind their  
contracts with the auction houses appeared to be disappointment 
over the selling price of their property.307  Notably, neither case  
included arguments that the plaintiffs felt pressured to consent to  
the contract.308 
Thus, rights of withdrawal may offer consignors yet another way 
of asking the court to permit them to back out of unfavorable  
agreements. However, the withdrawal rights were not written with 
 
302 Valentin, supra note 7. 
303 Id. 
304 See supra Part I.B. 
305 See Daniel Grant, Cost of Consigning Artwork? Don’t Forget, Most Fees Are 
Negotiable, OBSERVER (Feb. 12, 2016), https://observer.com/2016/02/cost-of-consigning-
artwork-dont-forget-most-fees-are-negotiable/ [https://perma.cc/PCX2-9B9E]. See also 
supra Part II.B.2. 
306 See, e.g., Vaks v. Ryan, 2012 Mass. App. Div. 17, 17–18 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2012); Holm 
v. Berner, No. 06-CA-140, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 3148 (Ohio Ct. App. June 29, 2007). 
307 See Vaks, 2012 Mass. App. Div. at 17–18; Holm, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 3440, ¶¶ 1–
3. 
308 See generally Vaks, 2012 Mass. App. Div. 17; Holm, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 3440. 
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the purpose of allowing dissatisfied customers to receive a full  
refund after services have been performed; this is not a satisfaction-
guarantee right.309 
Moreover, there are already protections in place that suggest 
withdrawal rights may not be necessary in the context of the contract 
with the consignor. 310  The competition between auction houses 
serves the interests of consignors.311 Auction houses compete with 
each other to offer the most favorable contract terms in order to  
obtain the consignment of top artwork for sale.312 The consignor is 
free to compare sales proposals, marketing plans, auction estimates, 
and reserve prices as they shop around for auction services. 313  
Consignors often negotiate over high-value artwork with auction 
houses right up until the moment that the catalogues go to print.314 
Further, the consignment agreement itself includes terms intended 
to protect consignors, including reserve prices,315 guarantees,316 and 
implied fiduciary duties.317 
 
309 See, e.g., 1995 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Non-Substantive Amendments, supra note 50, 
at 54184. 
310 See WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 114, 117 
311 See id.; see also HARVEY & MEISEL, supra note 134, at 9 (discussing the importance 
of competition in this market). 
312 WILSON, supra 149, at 47. 
313 See WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 114, 117. 
314 See Isaac Kaplan, 5 Questions to Ask an Auction House before Consigning a Work, 
ARTSY (July 31, 2017 5:03 PM), https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-5-questions-
auction-house-consigning-work  (discussing that the deadline to submit a work to auction 
is between 6 weeks to 3 months depending on the preliminary work the auction house must 
complete prior to the sale, including publishing an auction catalogue). 
315 A reserve is the minimum price at which a consignor agrees to sell a property. SMITH, 
supra note 11, at 140 (“[T]he selling party tends to be in the more dominant position in an 
art auction. This position of strength is greatly augmented by the fact that the auctioneer 
will generally protect the seller by setting a reserve price.”). 
316 Guarantee deals protect consignors by “guaranteeing” their consignment will sell for 
a good price. WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 158. With a guarantee, the auction house makes 
a promise to pay the consignor a minimum price no matter the results at auction, including 
if the property fails to sell. Id. at 160. Guarantees are like an insurance policy from the 
auction house. Id. 
317 Harter-Bachmann, supra note 115, at 11 (“Because the auction house is the seller’s 
agent, they offer their expertise and act as an intermediary between the seller and the buyer, 
balancing the information asymmetry between [consignors] and [winning bidders].”). 
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C. Unreasonable Sunk Costs of Preparing an Artwork for Sale at 
Auction 
The economic ramifications of extending the right to withdraw 
to art auctions include the dramatic decrease in the market value of 
the artwork and the substantial sunk costs of preparing the  
auction. 318  Who will bear the costs of administering returns of  
unwanted artwork? Under the rules, the seller, i.e., auction houses, 
must absorb these losses.319 However, it is likely that the costs will 
ultimately be transferred to the consumer, which would defeat the 
withdrawal rights’ objective of consumer protection.320 
If a successful bidder were able to freely withdraw at auction, 
both consumers and the auction house would suffer. Importantly, it 
is not guaranteed that the same concentration of interested  
purchasers would bid a second time, and the auctioneer will have 
lost the opportunity to maximize the sale price of the work for the 
consignor.321 Additionally, the auction house will have to internal-
ize the extensive cost of preparing the sale.322 Furthermore, in order 
to mitigate costs associated with cancellation, auction houses may 
opt to reduce the choice of items for sale or increase the vetting pro-
cess for bidders.323 This reduction of choice introduces one more  
inefficiency into this market—now ostensibly less artworks will  
be auctioned and when auctions do occur, the pieces will be  
more expensive.324 
If a consignor were able to withdraw after the auction, similar 
repercussions would materialize for the bidder and auctioneer. 
When no notice of the withdrawal right is provided, the rules permit 
a consignor to return a year or more after the auction took place to 
cancel the contract.325 As a result, the auctioneer would be in the 
 
318 See supra Parts II.B.3; III.A. 
319 See supra Part I.B. 
320 See Rekaiti & Van den Bergh, supra note 1, at 373. 
321 See Harter-Bachmann, supra note 115, at 7. 
322 See supra Part II.B.3. 
323 See Rekaiti & Van den Bergh, supra note 1, at 383–84 (discussing the harm to 
consumer that may result from reduced choice). 
324 See id. 
325 In fact, cooling-off periods typically extend indefinitely if the auctioneer concludes 
that it is not subject to the right of withdrawal and thus fails to provide the consignor both 
written and verbal notice of the right to cancel. See, e.g., Knight v. Colazzo, No. 24110, 
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awkward position of either (1) unwinding the sale to return both the 
consignor and the winning bidder to their positions prior to the sale, 
(2) refunding the consignor while the winning bidder keeps the 
goods, or (3) buying back a lot from the winning bidder that was 
already sold, and which may no longer be commercially viable.326 
Thus, the auctioneer would absorb the lost opportunity costs of the 
auction, sunk costs of preparing the sale, and the depreciation costs 
of the artwork. Ultimately, an auction house may respond to these 
costs by raising prices, reducing their goods and services, or  
delaying performance, all of which will harm consumers.327 
Even if notice requirements are met and the cooling-off period 
is limited to three days, the auctioneer still suffers reliance costs 
should the consignor “cool off” prior to the auction. By the time the 
consignment agreement is signed, the auction house has already  
invested significantly in preparing the sale by vetting the work, 
pitching marketing proposals, and potentially even shipping the  
artwork to the salesroom.328 Yet, free withdrawal means that the 
seller is not compensated for services already performed.329 
Proponents of the right to withdraw may argue that to mitigate 
expenses with regard to the consignor, the auction house could 
simply provide notice of the right and delay performance until the 
cooling-off period expires. However, the extended negotiations over 
the consignment contract often run until the moment the auction  
catalogue is published.330 If the sale has already been publicized 
when the consignor withdraws, the auction house risks reputational 
harm and lost profits from the embarrassment of losing a  
 
2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 5521, at **12 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (holding a buyer may 
withdraw from a contract almost six years after services were performed). For a list of 
states that extend cooling-off periods for lack of notice see infra Appendix A. 
326 Depending on when the auction took place, it may be unreasonable to ask the winning 
bidder, a good faith purchaser, to return the item that they purchased. Valentin, supra note 
7. 
327 See Rekaiti & Van den Bergh, supra note 1, at 383–84. 
328 See supra Part II.B.3. 
329 See supra Part I. 
330 Even if the auction is months away, the publication deadline for the catalogue may be 
within the cooling-off period. See Kaplan, supra note 314 (discussing deadlines for 
accepting a work to auction). On the other hand, if the sale is not yet public, it may be 
easier and less costly for the seller when the consignors cool-off. 
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consignment.331 As one art dealer put it: “The auctions’ publicity 
power works against them . . . .[i]f pieces don’t sell, everybody 
knows it right away and they start to worry about the market.”332  
In fact, the auction house’s very ability to conduct business is put  
in question.333 
Further, if the work has been damaged during the cooling-off 
period, the law is silent on whether the auctioneer may claim  
restitution for this depreciation in value.334 Buyers who can easily 
return products have weakened incentives to handle them carefully 
while they hold them.335 However, the free withdrawal policy means 
that consumers are not generally obligated to pay for depreciation.336 
In light of the substantial costs of administering “returns” in the  
context of an art auction, the seller’s reliance costs should  
be considered.337 
In addition, the increased transaction costs in creating custom 
contracts that comply with notice requirements may result in further 
harm to consumers. Currently, most contracts with auction houses 
contain standard terms.338 Typically, consignment agreements are 
the only documents negotiated. 339  Even these agreements will  
 
331 See HARVEY & MEISEL, supra note 134, at 9 (discussing competition amongst auction 
houses). 
332 Russell Shor, Spring 2019 Auctions: Premium Prices for Historic Pieces, GIA (Jun. 
14, 2019), https://www.gia.edu/gia-news-research/spring-2019-auctions-premium-prices-
historic-pieces. 
333 MERRYMAN, supra note 192, at 1012. 
334 See Valentin, supra note 7. 
335 See Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 16, at 145. 
336 See supra Part I. 
337 See Rekaiti & Van den Bergh, supra note 1, at 376 (discussing detrimental reliance); 
Ben-Shahar, supra note 291, at 269. 
338 See Grant, supra note 305 (noting that few auction house clients want to negotiate—
they would rather have fun and revel in their passion for art or collecting). 
339 Generally, terms that are amended include (1) complex financial arrangements 
(reserves, guarantees, etc.), (2) withdrawal, (3) warranties, (4) termination, and (5) 
insurance. See Grant, supra note 305 (discussing a few terms that may be negotiated in 
standard consignment agreements such as insurance); for a discussion on guarantees see 
WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 41–43; for a discussion on reserves see Rita Reif, Auctions, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 1985) https://www.nytimes.com/1985/08/02/arts/auctions.html 
[https://perma.cc/VA2J-5QFL]. Typically, withdrawal, in this context is understood as 
removal of a lot from auction, which usually occurs as a result of misattribution, or other 
doubts regarding ownership or authenticity. See Kaplan, supra note 259. 
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generally only be amended for highly coveted consignments where 
the auction houses are competing for the same sale.340 Considering 
the patchwork of state withdrawal rights, the different treatment of 
personal and business purchases, and the fact that even the major 
auction houses only provide for a small number of in-house  
attorneys, compliance with the rigorous notice requirements for 
withdrawal rights may be costly.341 These costs may be reasonably 
assumed to trickle down to consumers or even prompt auctioneers 
to leave the market.342 Because consumers would likely bear the 
cost of their protection through higher prices, the redistributive goals 
of free withdrawal may not be achieved.343 
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM OF U.S. RIGHTS OF WITHDRAWAL 
From a consumer protection perspective, applying rights of 
withdrawal to art auctions is ineffective. Reform of the U.S. rights 
of withdrawal could solve this problem easily. In the past, Public 
Auto Auction petitioned the FTC for an exception to the Cooling-
Off Rule, which prompted the Commission to categorically exempt 
auto auctions.344 In like manner, auction houses could petition the 
FTC for an exception for art auctions or an even broader exception 
for the sale of art.345 
As an alternative to such an industry-wide exception,  
amendments to the Cooling-Off Rule could reduce the incentives to 
 
340 See, e.g., WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 41–43 (discussing that one of the largest 
guarantees in auction history was offered by Sotheby’s to secure for consignment the sale 
of Alfred Taubmen’s collection, which was highly coveted by their direct competitor 
Christie’s). 
341 Cardozo Law School’s Art Law Society organized a symposium that included in-
house counsel at the world’s four major auction houses as speakers, namely Rebecca 
VanZandt of Phillips, Maggie Hoag of Christie’s, Patricia Pernes of Bonham’s, and Aimee 
Scilieri of Sotheby’s, who shared that the New York offices of these auction houses only 
include one to twelve in-house attorneys respectively. Cardozo Art Law Society & FAME 
Center Annual Symposium: From Consignment to the Auction Block (Mar. 25, 2019). 
342 Rekaiti & Van den Bergh, supra note 1, at 383, 395. 
343 Id. at 374. 
344 See 16 C.F.R. § 429.3(a). 
345 Under Section 18(g)(1) of FTCA “[a]ny person to whom a rule under subsection 
(a)(1)(B) of this section applies may petition the Commission for an exemption from such 
rule.” See 1987 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Proposed Exemptions, supra note 76, at 29541. 
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misuse the right of withdrawal.346 The risk of buyer’s opportunism 
could be addressed by amendments that require the buyer to cover 
the depreciation cost to the seller347 or cap the maximum purchase 
price of transactions that would be subject to the Rule. 
If granted, such amendments would hopefully prompt similar  
reform among the states. Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin have  
already created an explicit carve-out for auctions.348 On the other 
hand, should the Commission decline to amend the regulation, at 
least there would be certainty regarding the application of the Rule 
and auctioneers could adjust their business practices accordingly. 
A. Creating an Exemption for Art Auction Houses or the Sale  
of Art 
The ideal, most ambitious proposal for reform would provide a 
straightforward exception for art auctions. The FTC is likely to grant 
this exception because it is justified by the same reasoning the  
Commission used when it adopted an exception for auto auctions. 
In particular, the FTC found that auto auctions do not have the unfair 
practices which the Cooling-Off Rule was intended to remedy  
because consumers who intentionally attend an auction can easily 
escape the sales pitch.349 Likewise, cooling-off periods do not serve 
their intended purpose at art auctions because these transactions do 
not involve the same coercive sales techniques as seen in doorstep 
sales.350 
Additionally, this amendment would recognize that auction 
houses are regulated industries under fiduciary law.351 Fiduciary  
obligations are the “highest standard of conduct” under the law.352 
Auctioneers have legal responsibilities to consignors to take care of 
the goods in their possession and maximize profits from sales, and, 
to a lesser degree, they also owe a duty to winning bidders to  
 
346 BOLTON & DEWATRIPONT, supra note 280, at 169; Spindler, supra note 161, at 732. 
347 See Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 16, at 122; Bar-Gill, supra note 29, at 790. 
348 See MINN. STAT. § 325G.06(5) (2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.21(F)(6) 
(LexisNexis 2018); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 423.201(1) (LexisNexis 2018). 
349 See 1988 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Final Exemptions, supra note 76, at 45458 n.23. 
350 See supra Part II. 
351 See Harter-Bachmann, supra note 115, at 11, 44. 
352 GERSTENBLITH, supra note 119, at 299. 
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describe the goods accurately. 353  The California consumer  
protection statute bars consumers from enforcing withdrawal rights 
against certain types of “regulated professions,” including  
physicians, attorneys, and real estate brokers.354 The rationale for 
this exception is that extensive regulations are already in place for 
these professions; additionally, there are responsibilities inherent in 
such fiduciary relationships which make the likelihood of fraud or 
deception less likely.355 Therefore, it would not be such a radical 
concept to grant the art auction industry an exception in the same 
vein. An industry-wide exemption would also simplify the work of 
the Commission in crafting an amendment, as well as provide a 
bright-line rule for courts to follow.356 
Moreover, in the art market, consumer protection is already  
addressed through other remedies, such as breach of warranty claims 
in contract, or fraud and misrepresentations claims about  
authenticity in tort. 357  In addition, several states have enacted  
comprehensive legislation specific to the art market to deal with 
 
353 See Cristallina S.A. v. Christie, Manson & Woods Int’l, Inc., 502 N.Y.S.2d 165, 171 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (holding that an auctioneer, as an agent to the consignor, has a 
fiduciary duty “to act in the utmost good faith” in the interest of the consignor). But see 
Brenna Adler, The International Art Auction Industry: Has Competition Tarnished Its 
Finish, 23 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 433 (2003) (discussing that the auction industry has not 
always adhered to these high standards). 
354 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1689.5(d) (Deering 2018). 
355 See Williams v. Kapilow & Son, Inc., 164 Cal. Rptr. 176, 180–81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) 
(holding that the Home Solicitation Sales Act applied to the services of an insurance 
adjustment firm and that there was a rational basis for the exemptions for regulated 
professions in the statute). 
356 “A bright-line rule has the advantage of providing clear guidance . . . . Clarity as to 
what the law requires is generally a good thing.” Welch v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 801 
N.W.2d 590, 601 (Iowa 2011). 
357 See generally, e.g., Pasternack v. Essay Art Galleries, 90 F. Supp. 849 (W.D. Ark. 
1950) (inducing a buyer to bid at an auction by fraud or misrepresentation will entitle the 
buyer to rescind the contract); Dawson v. G. Malina, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 
1978) (plaintiff-buyer of allegedly inauthentic ancient Chinese vases brought action for 
breach of warranty); Balog v. Ctr. Art Gallery-Hawaii, 745 F. Supp. 1556 (D. Haw. 1990) 
(plaintiff-buyer of allegedly inauthentic Salvator Dali works brought claims of breach of 
express warranty and fraudulent concealment); Rogath v. Siebenmann, 129 F.3d 261 (2d 
Cir. 1997) (plaintiff-buyer of allegedly inauthentic Francis Bacon painting brought claims 
of breach of warranty and fraud against seller); Krahmer v. Christie’s, Inc., 903 A.2d 773 
(Del. Ct. Ch. 2006) (plaintiff-buyer of allegedly inauthentic Frank Weston Benson painting 
brought claim of fraud and negligent misrepresentation against seller). 
2020] CAVEAT VENDOR 857 
 
questions of authenticity and art market practices.358  Intuitively, 
these remedies are more appropriate in art transactions than  
cooling-off period rules because, not only were they were designed 
with market-specific analysis in mind, but also they get to the heart 
of the dispute and openly address the true source of the conflict.359 
Furthermore, these remedies show that an exclusion for art auctions 
would not leave the consumer without protection. 
In the alternative, a broad exemption for the sale of art would 
follow the logic of behavioral economics scholars who argue that 
regulation based on market-specific analysis provides for the  
optimal contract. 360  As mentioned above, art exists in its own  
“economic microcosm,” such that a cancelled sale “burns” the art 
and causes material harm to unique items.361 This market-specific 
analysis suggests that, on balance, withdrawal rights do more harm 
than good in art transactions.362 Empirical research into whether a 
significant number of buyers are exercising the right to withdraw at 
art auctions and whether this outstrips otherwise successful sales 
may be useful in further evaluating the net harm to the industry.  
Further, while a definition for “art” may be difficult to craft,  
it is not impossible, as illustrated by existing art market  
specific legislation.363 
B. Requiring Consumers to Cover the Cost of Cancellation 
A more modest proposal for reform would at least reduce the 
costs of withdrawal rights and the potential for abuse of these rights. 
There are a number of cases which demonstrate that the withdrawal 
right is being exploited.364 In auction-related cases, disputes arose 
when a consumer claimed to be dissatisfied with the services  
received. 365  Thus, rather than cooling-off rules serving their  
purpose—to provide a cooling-off period to buyers—it has been 
 
358 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 686.504-505 (LexisNexis 2018); IOWA CODE §§ 715B1-B4 
(2018); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 11.01-16.01 (2018). 
359 See supra Parts I.A.2; II.C.2. 
360 See supra Part I.A.2. 
361 See supra Part II.A. 
362 See supra Part III. 
363 See, e.g., N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 11.01–16.01. 
364 See supra Part II.C.2. 
365 See supra Part II.C.2. 
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transformed into a satisfaction-guarantee right.366 If the purpose of 
the rules are to give consumers protection against high pressure 
door-to-door sales by providing them time to cancel these contracts, 
then the effect of the rules does not match with this purpose. 
An amendment that requires consumers to compensate sellers 
for the diminished value of the goods and sunk costs through  
depreciation loss or cancellation fees could minimize abuses of the 
right to withdraw, such as moral hazard, and still protect the  
consumer.367 Even advocates for withdrawal rights have recognized 
that the optimal contract includes a balancing of the buyer’s gain 
with the seller’s loss.368 
Depreciation costs could fully account for the diminished  
market value of art subject to cancellation. However, the drawback 
of depreciation costs is that they are often difficult to calculate,369 
which makes a general exception for art or art auctions an easier 
remedy to implement.370 When an artwork fails to sell, the best way 
to determine its depreciation in value is through the market’s  
response.371 This calculation may not be available until the work is 
resold, if it can be resold.372 A solution could be to use the average 
depreciation value put forth by studies, i.e., 27–33%.373 Yet, this  
average may fluctuate largely, depending on the specific work of art 
and the circumstances of the cancelled sale.374 Hence, alternatively, 
as Omri Ben-Shahar has suggested, time could be used as a proxy 
for depreciation.375 
 
366 See supra Part I. 
367 Rekaiti & Van den Bergh, supra note 1, at 382 (noting that the moral hazard problem 
could be deterred by imposing depreciation costs on the consumer). 
368 See Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 16, at 121; see also Rekaiti & Van den Bergh, 
supra note 1, at 394 (“As long as such a penalty imposed on the consumer deciding to 
withdraw from the . . .  agreement can be justified as a counterpart to the costs incurred by 
the [seller] it may be considered . . .  efficient.”). 
369 See BI Report, supra note 2. 
370 See Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 16, at 138, 144 (discussing that withdrawal 
rights are ill suited to markets where depreciation is difficult to measure). 
371 See BI Report, supra note 2. 
372 See id. 
373 See id; see also Beggs & Graddy, supra note 126, at 18, 20. 
374 See Beggs & Graddy, supra note 126, at 22. 
375 See Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 16, at 122. 
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Because depreciation costs are difficult to calculate, a set  
cancellation fee might be a more practical solution.376 A number of 
states already provide for liquidated damages clauses or cancellation 
fees for sellers when a buyer exercises the right to withdraw.377  
Unfortunately for sellers, these provisions could currently be 
preempted by the federal regulation.378 Therefore, it would make 
sense to harmonize the federal regulation with state statutes by 
amending the regulation to include a cancellation fee. 
Without an explicit amendment for cancellation fees or  
depreciation costs, consumers may inevitably bear the cost of “free” 
withdrawals. In practice, the costs sellers expect to suffer as a result 
of regulation generally translates into higher prices.379 Ultimately, 
the buyer will pay more up front as insurance against a poor  
purchase.380 Thus, ironically, the buyer is made worse off by the 
right to free withdrawal as a result of the seller’s price increase.381 
Therefore, not only do free withdrawals create inefficiency in the art 
market,382 but in practice they actually undermine the redistributive 
objective of the withdrawal policy.383 Clearly, it is in the consumer’s 
best interest for the FTC to prescribe a specific percentage cancella-
tion fee or provide for a method to calculate depreciation costs. 
C. Excluding Transactions Over a Maximum Purchase Price 
Alternatively, amending the Cooling-Off Rule to cap the  
maximum purchase price of transactions subject to the right of  
withdrawal would be another way to minimize buyer’s opportunism. 
A cap would encourage consumers to develop rational purchase  
behavior when they are involved in complex and high-value  
 
376 See id. 
377 Andrew Randol, Ohio’s Home Solicitation Sales Act: Consumer Protection 
Overreach, 10 OHIO ST. BUS. L.J. 73, 86 (2015) (noting that Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island all have statutes that provide for liquidated 
damages clauses or cancellation fees for sellers when a buyer exercises the right to 
withdraw). 
378 See supra Part I.B. 
379 See Ben-Shahar & Posner, supra note 16, at 122. 
380 Id. at 129. 
381 Id. 
382 Id. at 122. 
383 Id. at 130. 
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transactions. As the 2008 financial crisis shows, irrational spending 
harms not only consumers, but can also devastate economies.384 
Generally, the purchase of relatively inexpensive goods is held 
to a lesser standard of care and consumers do not give much thought 
to the transaction because they often capitulate to impulse buys.385 
Yet, art auctions involve carefully curated pieces with a historic past 
that are expected to reach record prices.386 Such transactions should 
be held to a higher standard of care. Buyers over a certain maximum 
threshold would merely be asked to exercise more care and precision 
in their purchases for these valuable items.387 Thus, setting a limit 
on transactions subject to cancellation would encourage more  
efficiency in the market. 
Indeed, transactions in the art trade demand due diligence.388 
Consumers in this market need to confirm authenticity and assess 
price accuracy, in addition to evaluating their personal use value and 
 
384 See Andy Hira, Irrational Exuberance: An Evolutionary Perspective on the 
Underlying Causes of the Financial Crisis, 48 INTERECONOMICS 116, 121 (2013). 
385 Bar-Gill, supra note 29, at 758. 
386 Auction houses sell items in the following categories: fine art, decorative arts (e.g., 
furniture, ceramics), and luxury goods (e.g., jewelry, watches, wine, handbags). 
WOODHAM, supra note 11, at 11; see also Nate Freeman, The 20 Most Expensive Artworks 
Sold at Auction in 2018, ARTSY (Dec. 24, 2018), https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-
editorial-20-expensive-artworks-sold-2018 (last visited Feb. 17, 2020) (noting that the sale 
of Kerry James Marshall’s Past Times (1997) for $21.1 million was not even within the 
top 50 most expensive artworks sold in 2018). 
387 See Bar-Gill, supra note 29, at 758. 
388 Purchasers have a right to inspect goods for sale at auction previews. LEONARD D. 
DUBOFF ET AL., THE DESKBOOK OF ART LAW M-70 (2008). In fact, because goods at auction 
are sold “as is,” buyers are highly encouraged to do so. Id. Auction house conditions of 
sale typically contain a disclaimer, warning purchasers to personally inspect lot items. See, 
e.g., Conditions of Online-Only Sale, supra note 5, at 2 (“Prospective buyers acknowledge 
this fact and accept responsibility for carrying out inspections and investigations to satisfy 
themselves as to the lots in which they may be interested.”). In Christie’s Inc. v. Dominica 
Holding Corp., the court noted that buyers have heightened duties of due diligence when 
an auctioneer includes a disclaimer to examine property. Christie’s Inc. v. Dominica 
Holding Corp., 2006 WL 2012607, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The Supreme Court of New 
York has also found that sophisticated buyers operating in the top price brackets should 
conduct due diligence. MAFG Art Fund, LLC v. Gagosian, 123 A.D.3d 458, 459 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2014). 
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the intrinsic value of the artwork prior to a purchase. 389  Thus,  
capping the price of transactions subject to the right would provide 
an incentive for buyers in this market to act according to industry 
practice.390 Buyers in the art market already tend to come from a 
highly discerning group.391 Art auctions particularly attract a group 
of buyers who are knowledgeable about art and experienced  
with traditional auction principles.392 Therefore, it would not be  
difficult for consumers to adjust to such an amendment of the  
withdrawal right. 
Although a boundary may be hard to set for the Commission, it 
does not follow that no cap should be added to withdrawal rights. 
Research into the optimum cost-benefit function, similar to that used 
to set the minimum threshold, would help in determining the ideal 
cap. Incidentally, the minimum threshold requirement was primarily 
included in the Rule as a result of industry lobbying to protect the 
livelihood of route salesmen, such as milkmen, who provided  
essential services or products. 393  Thus, the lack of any current  
maximum limit could mean a few different things. Perhaps the 
Rule’s drafters were in fact concerned about large sales, or they did 
not think that door-to-door sales would encompass high value  
transactions. Or perhaps they simply failed to consider the need for 
an exclusionary cap, which artworld stakeholders could now make 
clear to the Commission. 
CONCLUSION 
The extension of withdrawal rights to the sale of art at auction 
would be detrimental not only to the value of the artwork on the 
auction block, and the auction house, but most importantly, to the 
consumer. This result in the art market can be attributed to the fact 
that regulators neglected relevant market-specific insights when 
 
389 See MERRYMAN, supra note 192, at 965. Two different types of due diligence are 
usually performed: (1) legal, regarding ownership; and (2) artistic, including authenticity 
and provenance. See id. 
390 The use of an art advisor or art consultant is a common practice in the art market. See 
id. at 970. 
391 See SMITH, supra note 11, at 69. 
392 See id. 
393 FTC Cooling-Off Rule Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 31, at 22945–46. 
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drafting the rules, which suggests the need for new approaches  
to regulation. 
Despite a plausible application of withdrawal rights to art  
auctions, the FTC should amend the Cooling-Off Rule to clearly  
exclude art auctions. Art auctions differ from other markets where 
door-to-door sales are prevalent in terms of the valuation of goods, 
the sales practices, as well as the relative sophistication and  
bargaining power of contracting parties. The effects of extending 
cooling-off rules to this market do not comport with the  
intended purpose of these rules to protect against high-pressure 
home solicitation sales. An industry-wide exception for art auctions 
is the best solution because it not only responds to the intended  
purpose of cooling-off rules, but also acknowledges that art is in-
compatible with the right to cancel. Further, there is a high  
likelihood that the FTC would adopt an exclusion for art auctions 
because it has already excluded auto auctions using the same  
purpose-based argument. 
At minimum, the FTC should amend the Rule to discourage 
buyer’s opportunism and the use of withdrawal as a satisfaction 
guarantee right. Imposing a cancellation fee or a cap will correct 
incentives while still protecting consumers by giving them a  
cooling-off period. These amendments are both relatively simple to 
adopt: all that would be needed is research into the optimal  
cost-benefit functions and the political will to accomplish the  
objective. However, while these solutions will prevent abuse, they 
fall short of addressing the fundamental incompatibility of the right 
to cancel with art sales. 
Consumer protection law should respond to the particular  
behavior of people who enter bargains within the context of their 
promises, which includes the art market. Otherwise, consumer  
protection law will only end up hurting the people it is supposed to 
help. Given the tremendous potential costs of inaction and the ease 
of reform efforts, auction houses should not hesitate to make this 
reform a reality by petitioning for an industry-wide exception. 
Traditionally, the legal system has misunderstood specialized  
areas of the law like art. In this respect, Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes has acknowledged the lack of expertise of the judge and 
jury, and the limitations of litigation in achieving the objectives of 
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an art dispute.394 To solve this problem a team of creative New 
York-based art lawyers developed a new forum dedicated  
exclusively to resolving art-related disputes, the Court of Arbitration 
for Art.395 As this example illustrates, it is upon stakeholders in the 
artworld to proactively develop new approaches to regulation of the 
right to withdraw as it relates to art transactions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
394 See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It would 
be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves 
final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most 
obvious limits.”). 
395 See About Us, COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR ART, https://www.cafa.world/cafa/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z7DB-CZP7]. 
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